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Summary
The vast potential of renewable energy is failing to be realised in many African 
countries, in spite of the many pledges made by donors and international 
financiers. This is not due to a lack of policies supporting investment. Many African 
countries have renewable energy targets, feed-in-tariffs (FiT), or import duty 
exemptions for renewable energy technologies. In some cases these policies are 
not fully implemented. In others they are implemented but, put in the language 
of this report, they are not targeting the most binding constraints to investment. 
Whatever the reason for their lack of success, it is clear that simply introducing 
formal policies is not enough. 
This Research Report presents the Green Investment Diagnostics methodology 
that aims at supporting policymakers to better target policies for the promotion 
of renewable energy investment. Our approach draws from the original Growth 
Diagnostics developed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (2004) to identify the 
most binding constraints to economic growth in developing countries. We adapt 
that approach to the particular case of the energy sector, so that we can identify 
the main bottlenecks faced by renewable energy investors in a particular country. 
We start by asking: for this particular country, at this particular time, what 
is preventing higher levels of investment in renewable energy generation 
technologies for which there is an economic rationale? To answer this question 
we follow a systematic approach, which starts with a decision tree analysis and 
continues with the cumulative building of evidence to back up potentially binding 
constraints. We apply the new methodology to two Sub-Saharan African countries, 
Kenya and Ghana, but this exercise could be replicated in any other context.
In Ghana, we look for the reasons for underinvestment in renewable generation 
capacity. We find that renewable energy investments provide low returns in the 
country, disproportionate with the very high risks coming from an unreliable 
off-taker, poor regulation, macroeconomic imbalances and corruption. Furthermore, 
there is insufficient access to finance due to scarce domestic finance and high 
returns expectation for short-term loans.
In Kenya, we first look for factors behind the successful attraction of investment 
for large-scale renewables, mainly wind and geothermal. We then focus on the 
constraints to future investment, particularly in flexible, smaller-scale technologies 
more appropriate for increasing electrification rates in rural areas. Kenya offers 
generous returns to investment in renewables and least cost generation from 
geothermal and wind. However, it faces high system costs due to a lack of 
networking infrastructure and an inflexible generation mix. It also presents 
regulatory constraints at the planning and procurement stages and serious 
problems of social acceptance. Social problems are exacerbated by uncertain land 
property rights and consultation processes, inequality in access to services, and 
the rent-seeking behaviour of local elites.
At the heart of each country’s constraints there is a stable status quo in each 
country: the over-borrowing state in Ghana, and a rent-capturing elite in Kenya.
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1 Introduction
Access to reliable and affordable electricity is an essential condition for human 
development. Electricity provides services such as lighting, the refrigeration of 
food and medicines, and pumping of water for consumption and irrigation. It 
powers information and communications technologies (ICTs) and drives motors 
in lifts, cranes, mills, pumps, compressors and other machine tools. Industrial 
development is unimaginable without electricity. On the other hand, electricity 
generation is a major contributor to local air pollution and a key source of the 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions responsible for climate change due to a 
heavy reliance on fossil fuels. According to the Fifth Assessment report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), electricity generation 
contributed a quarter of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010 (IPCC 2014). 
The international development community increasingly recognises the need to 
achieve universal access to modern energy without jeopardising climate stability. 
Several initiatives demonstrate this. The Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) 
programme launched by the United Nations in 2011, for example, set three 
targets to be achieved by 2030: universal access to modern energy, doubling 
of renewables in the energy mix, and doubling the global rate of improvement 
in energy efficiency. These targets are reflected in the seventh goal of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Many other initiatives embrace similar 
goals, particularly for Africa. Examples include: the New Energy Deal for Africa, 
from the African Development Bank; the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), 
under the mandate of the African Union; Power Africa, sponsored by the United 
States; and the UK Energy Africa campaign.
The reason for the focus on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is clear. The region has the 
lowest access to modern energy in the world, but is also set to be hit hardest by 
the effects of climate change. Of the 1.2 billion people without access to electricity 
worldwide, 53 per cent live in SSA, where the average electrification rate is 35 per 
cent. Rural electrification rates are well below this average figure, at under 10 per 
cent in many countries (IEA 2017). Furthermore, the number of people lacking 
electricity is set to increase, as population growth outpaces efforts to promote 
electrification. SSA will struggle to meet energy-related SDGs by 2030, when 
645 million Africans could still lack access to electricity (IEA 2014). 
Africa’s deficit in electricity infrastructure not only keeps connection rates low but also 
delivers a substandard service for those who are connected. This is costly for the 
economy: power outages cause losses equivalent to between 3 and 7 per cent of the 
sales of enterprises (Eifert, Gelb and Ramachandran 2008) and the lack of reliable 
electricity is often rated as the highest constraint to enterprise growth (Goedhuys 
and Sleuwaegen 2010). This poor performance is the result of insufficient investment 
in the three components of the electricity system: generation, transmission and 
distribution (Eberhard et al. 2016; Pueyo, Orraca and Godfrey-Woods 2015). As a 
result of underinvestment, Africa’s abundant energy resources remain unutilised. 
SSA is rich in both fossil fuels and renewable energy. Today, the case for investment 
in renewable energy is increasingly strong and not only for environmental reasons. 
The economics of renewable energy in Africa is becoming compelling as costs 
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have fallen dramatically in recent years. Energy security is also a strong motivation 
in many countries, not least because of the size and volatility of fossil fuel imports. 
The narrative of renewables as a luxury only affordable to high-income countries is 
increasingly falling apart. For the first time, in 2015 developing countries invested 
more than developed countries in renewable energy (Frankfurt School–UNEP 
Centre/BNEF 2016).1 In the same year, more renewable than fossil fuel-based 
capacity was added to the global generation mix (REN21 2016). Despite undoubted 
progress, most developing country investment in renewable energy is concentrated 
in a small number of economies, particularly China, India, South Africa and Mexico. 
Excluding South Africa, SSA still struggles to attract investment for generation 
capacity in general, and renewables in particular.
The literature is replete with attempts to understand why this situation persists. 
Most broadly, previous research suggests that shortages of capital, skills and 
governance capacity prevent Africa from using its plentiful renewable energy 
resources (Collier and Venables 2012). A long list of more specific problems 
affecting all types of generation technologies can also be found. These include: 
underpricing, financial weakness of electric utilities, corruption and patronage, 
flawed and uncertain regulation, low savings rates, poorly developed financial 
markets, low and dispersed demand, high transmission losses, constricted power 
generation planning, or lack of technological knowledge (Gratwick and Eberhard 
2008; Collier and Venables 2012; Suberu et al. 2013).
As well as highlighting a multitude of constraints, academics and practitioners 
have proposed a commensurate amount of policies to address them. From the 
1990s, development finance institutions (DFIs) promoted the standard model of 
power sector reform to deal with the failures of Africa’s centralised power utilities 
and to raise private finance for capacity expansion. The key elements of this model 
were unbundling, privatisation, competition and independent regulatory oversight 
(Malgas and Eberhard 2011). To date, the standard model has not been fully 
implemented by any African country. What has emerged instead are hybrid power 
systems, where incumbent state-owned utilities remain dominant but independent 
power producers (IPPs) are used to fill financing gaps (Gratwick and Eberhard 
2008). These hybrid systems tend to be very inefficient and have failed to attract 
private investment at anything like the levels needed.
A more recent wave of reform targets renewable energy investment specifically. 
Renewable energy investments face additional problems in Africa as they require 
large upfront investments and project viability is dependent on maintaining stable, 
long-term revenues. They are therefore very vulnerable to both the high financing 
costs and uncertain regulatory environment prevalent in the region. To address 
these problems, donors have promoted feed-in tariffs (FiT) as a cornerstone 
instrument to guarantee long-term, fixed-price electricity purchase agreements 
and grid access. FiT have been successfully implemented in many Northern and 
Southern countries, such as Germany and China, where they have contributed to the 
widespread deployment and dramatic cost reduction of wind and solar photovoltaics 
(PV) (Hoppmann, Huenteler and Girod 2014). As of 2016, ten African countries had 
approved FiT: Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Senegal, Tanzania, Egypt, Algeria, 
1 Excluding large hydro.
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Nigeria and Mauritius (REN21 2016). Despite this, FiT have not attracted significant 
investment in renewables to these countries. In many of them there is not a single 
project benefiting from FiT several years after they were approved. 
The examples of comprehensive power sector reform and FiT illustrate how policies 
that work wonders in some countries can be ineffective in others. Reflecting on 
the demise of the standard model of power sector reform, Besant-Jones (2006) 
underlined the need to adapt reform to the national conditions. No African country had 
anything like the conditions of the UK, USA, Chile and Norway, whose power sector 
reform they tried to emulate. These countries had excess capacity, near universal 
electricity access and financially healthy utilities. African power systems had none of 
those characteristics and their systems were too small to enable efficient competition 
(Gratwick and Eberhard 2008). The success of FiT in Germany and China also built in 
characteristics that are absent in SSA, such as large markets, low financing costs and 
confidence that the governments would honour the commitments made. 
This research starts from the position that simply attempting to replicate successful 
policies from other countries is unlikely to bring much needed investment for 
Africa’s renewable electricity generation. Worse, attempting to do so will see 
scarce political and financial resources wasted. The same resources could achieve 
more if they targeted the most important constraints to investment in each country 
at a particular time. If this is so, the key task is to find a way to prioritise between 
the many problems that can usually be identified. 
This rationale underpins the development of the Green Investment Diagnostics 
methodology, which seeks to systematically identify the ‘binding’ constraints to 
investment in renewable energy. Our method is an adaptation of the Growth 
Diagnostics framework developed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco (HRV) (2004) 
to identify the key constraints holding back economic growth. Their approach was 
driven by the needs of policymakers facing multiple causes, but lacking the ability to 
tackle all of them at once, or to prioritise between them. The solution proposed was 
to identify and concentrate limited resources on the ‘binding constraint’ which would 
be identified with a tool conceptualised as a decision tree.
Growth Diagnostics have been widely applied by multilateral organisations to 
better target support for growth promotion. Our Green Investment Diagnostics 
approach seeks to support policymakers targeting the promotion of investment in 
renewable energy. We contribute to the original Growth Diagnostics by adapting 
the HRV decision tree to a sectoral, not national, analysis and by incorporating 
political economy, macroeconomic modelling and energy system elements.2 We 
pilot this new methodology in two African countries: Kenya and Ghana. These 
countries are the research hubs of East and West Africa and showcase the 
choices SSA faces as it aims to provide universal access to affordable energy, 
foster economic growth and reduce the vulnerability to imported fuels and erratic 
hydrological resources. They offer an interesting comparison as their power 
systems face very different challenges. Kenya’s power system is financially 
sound and there is a large share of renewable energy, but demand is low and 
access rates are among the lowest in Africa. The share of renewables other than 
2 All these are included in separate documents. 
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large hydro in Ghana is negligible, and its power system is struggling financially. 
However, Ghana has reached one of the largest connection rates in SSA, even if 
the quality of that access has fast deteriorated.
This report describes our methodology and findings in Kenya and Ghana. While 
the focus is predominantly on grid-connected facilities, we acknowledge the 
importance of investment in smaller-scale off-grid systems in both countries and 
appreciate that the constraints will be very different to those for larger facilities. 
The report starts by providing some background about investment in renewable 
electricity in Kenya and Ghana. Section 3 describes the Green Investment 
Diagnostics methodology. Section 4 and Section 5 apply the methodology to our 
target countries. Section 6 discusses the results of the analysis and the challenges 
that arise when applying the Green Investment Diagnostics approach to small and 
complex energy systems. Section 7 concludes by inviting policymakers and donors 
to replicate the approach in other countries and regions. 
2 Background of  renewable energy 
investment in Kenya and Ghana
This section introduces the context of investment in renewable energy in Kenya 
and Ghana. It shows the status of energy access in the countries, generation 
capacity needs, the types of generation technologies that have been prioritised 
so far, and the role of renewables in the generation mix. This background helps 
to focus the question that the diagnostics should answer: is there a shortage of 
investment in generation capacity? If so, does it affect all types of technologies, 
or just renewable energy, and which specific renewable energy technologies? If 
current demand can easily be met with existing capacity, what types of plants have 
been prioritised? This section also reviews the previous literature about obstacles 
to investment in renewables in Kenya and Ghana. It finalises by comparing the 
departing situations of both countries and suggesting the focus of each diagnosis. 
2.1 Ghana 
Ghana performs relatively well on access to electricity with a 72 per cent access 
rate, compared to an average of 35 per cent in SSA (IEA 2016).3 The quality of this 
access is poor, however, with very low consumption levels and prevalent power 
outages. Insufficient power generation is the major cause of this situation. At the 
end of 2014 Ghana had an official capacity of 2,831 megawatts (MW), but only 
1,482MW were available. The gross electricity supplied in the same year was 
12,906GWh against requirements of 14,571–15,351GWh (EC 2015a). And the 
situation is getting worse. Electricity demand is growing at 6–7 per cent per year 
but capacity is not growing at a similar pace. As a result, rolling blackouts have 
been part of Ghanaians’ everyday life since 2012.4 
3 Here access is understood as connection to electricity.
4 Rolling blackouts or load shedding is the practice of temporarily reducing the supply of electricity to an 
area to avoid overloading the generators.
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In the World Bank’s 2013 Enterprise Surveys, firms reported an average of 
8.4 power outages per month, resulting in the loss of 11.5 per cent of sales (World 
Bank 2013b). Both figures are significantly above the average for SSA, and far 
above the average for lower middle-income (LMI) countries. Electricity supply is 
identified as the main obstacle to growth by 20 per cent of Ghanaian firms. The 
2015 Energy Outlook prepared by the Energy Commission (EC) estimates that the 
total installed capacity needs to increase by some 800–1,000MW to eliminate load 
shedding. This would raise consumption per capita to 600kWh, more in line with 
the average for LMI countries (EC 2015a).
Ghana’s power crisis has been caused by a mixture of underinvestment in new 
generation capacity, low hydrological resources due to a shift in rainfall patterns 
and poor management of reservoir levels, and disruptions in natural gas supply 
from Nigeria. Hydropower provided 56 per cent of Ghana’s installed capacity 
in 2014 and generated 65 per cent of electricity. The remaining 46 per cent of 
capacity comes from oil and natural gas thermal power plants, which generate 
35 per cent of power in the country. 
The government has signed contentious contracts with four IPPs for 1,370MW 
of oil and gas emergency power plants to provide a short-term solution to the 
crisis. The new plants are likely to run on oil due to challenges in securing an 
adequate gas supply (EC 2015a). The cost of electricity from emergency oil plants 
was estimated in the Energy Outlook at 19 USD cents per kWh and that from 
gas plants at 13 USD cents per kWh, while Ghana’s composite tariff for hydro 
and thermal plants was 6.3 USD cents per kWh in June 2015 (PURC 2015). 
Emergency generation is hence a very expensive and carbon intensive option in 
comparison to the current generation mix. 
The new contracted power plants have quickly become operational, which is part 
of their appeal of course. Two plants with a combined capacity of 480MW started 
operations in February 2016 and the rest are scheduled to be ready in under two 
years. Greenfield baseload plants such as large hydropower, combined liquefied 
natural gas- (LNG) fired and coal power facilities would take between five and seven 
years to construct (EC 2015a).5 New emergency plants are hence justified as a quick 
way to buy time for hydropower dams to recover sustainable water levels, thermal 
plants to undergo major maintenance, new greenfield baseload plants such as large 
hydropower, combined LNG-fired and coal power facilities to be constructed, and for 
the power sector to undergo reform processes. An important factor, however, is that 
the government has signed ten-year contracts, which means the country could be 
locked in expensive and carbon-intensive electricity for the next decade. 
Despite this, both the Ghanaian government and the World Bank see ‘clean and 
affordable’ natural gas as the long-term solution to the power crisis solution in 
Ghana (EC 2015a; World Bank 2013a, 2015b). For example, the World Bank has 
provided USD700 million in guarantees for the upstream natural gas sector to 
supply fuel to 1,000MW of power generation capacity. The increase of gas supplies 
for domestic generation will require a diversification of the sources of imported 
5 The baseload on a grid is the minimum level of demand on an electrical grid over 24 hours. Baseload 
power sources are power stations which can consistently generate the electrical power needed to 
satisfy this minimum demand.
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gas, however, as well as investments in LNG and the exploitation of indigenous 
offshore natural gas resources. The long-term generation plan also considers the 
use of imported coal, which will contribute to significantly increasing Ghana’s grid 
emission factor, currently at 0.56tCO2/MWh (Republic of Ghana 2015).
Apart from large hydro, renewable energy plants are not seen as part of the 
solution to the energy crisis in national planning documents (EC 2015a; Ministry of 
Energy 2010). Although the government has committed to increasing their share 
to 10 per cent, renewables are presented as too expensive to be competitive 
(Ministry of Energy 2010) or not feasible due to lack of experience with these 
technologies (Fritsch and Poudineh 2016). 
The Renewable Energy Law adopted in 2011 provided fiscal incentives and a 
regulatory framework for private investment but progress towards the 10 per cent 
target has been very slow. Of the 82 projects totalling nearly 6,600MW of capacity 
that had obtained provisional wholesale supply and generation licences by May 
2016, only one 20MW solar PV plant has been built (EC 2016b). 
Rooftop solar PV energy has enjoyed more political support than other renewable 
alternatives and is expected to reduce the daily national peak load by 200MW.6 
Households and businesses receive incentives to invest through capital subsidies 
and net metering, which give consumers the option to trade their excess generation 
for grid electricity when they are in deficit (EC 2015c).7 At the moment, net metering 
is a weak incentive as consumers cannot trust that grid electricity will be available 
when they need it, and the scheme does not consider monetary compensation for 
excess sales of electricity.8 Energy efficiency is also a key element of the solution 
to the energy crisis. Ghana was the first country in SSA to develop an energy 
efficiency standards and labelling programme for household appliances. Energy 
performance standards have delivered considerable energy savings and have been 
particularly successful in promoting efficient lighting (IEA 2015).
Ghana has good renewable energy resources (Gyamfi, Modjinou and Djordjevic 
2015). It is particularly rich in hydropower resources, which have been harnessed 
to a large extent, but substantial potential is still untapped for small hydropower 
plants. Wind energy potential is estimated to be about 2,000MW and is located 
in the coastal areas and along the border with Togo.9 Solar energy resources are 
particularly good in the northern regions, with a mean annual Global Horizontal 
Irradiation (GHI) of 5.74kWh/m2/day (Ecreee/Ecowrex 2015). There are currently 
no wind, mini-hydro or biomass plants connected to the grid and just two solar PV 
plants totalling 22.5MW. Planned capacity additions by the national generation 
utility Volta River Authority (VRA) until 2020 are predominantly fossil fuel based. 
6 Peak load is a period in which electrical power is expected to be provided for a sustained period at a 
significantly higher than average supply level.
7 Net metering is a billing mechanism that credits solar PV energy system owners for the energy they 
feed to the grid when their system generates more electricity than the home uses during daylight hours. 
8 Excess sales of electricity take place when rooftop solar PV panels generate more electricity than the 
household needs and this is sold to the grid.
9 www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=430andArticleID=4771andl=en 
(accessed 11 November 2015).
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They include a 700MW supercritical coal power plant with a planned extension to 
reach 2,000MW, in partnership with the Chinese company Shenzen Energy. VRA 
would also add nearly 600MW of gas power plants in addition to 400MW from 
IPPs. Renewables play a marginal role, with 150MW of wind power and 12MW of 
solar PV planned by VRA (EC 2015a). It therefore seems inevitable that Ghana’s 
fossil fuel-based pathway to address its energy crisis will compromise climate 
change mitigation goals and energy security. Furthermore, reliance on expensive 
fossil fuel imports will be a drain on Ghana’s finances. 
The most frequently reported constraints to renewable energy investment in 
Ghana are regulatory. The literature refers to creditworthiness of the national 
distribution company Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), low electricity tariffs, 
access to finance and technical and capabilities shortages (Malgas and Eberhard 
2011; IRENA 2015b; Fritsch and Poudineh 2016; CEPA 2015; World Bank 2013a; 
Gyamfi et al. 2015). The Ghanaian government has taken some measures to 
address these constraints. For example, it approved a renewable energy FiT 
policy and more recently initiated a competitive tender for 20MW of solar PV.10 It 
has initiated the partial privatisation of ECG with the support of the US Millennium 
Development Authority (MiDA). In December 2015, a 59 per cent increase in 
residential end-user electricity tariffs was approved (PURC 2015). The government 
has also established a Renewable Energy Fund to mobilise financial resources for 
the promotion, development, sustainable management and utilisation of renewable 
energy resources (IRENA 2015b). 
These policies have not always been effective. For example, the FiT that was 
announced in 2013 had not been used at the time of writing. The solar PV auction 
announced in December 2015 had still not delivered any result by September 
2016. The privatisation of ECG is also dragging behind schedule. The Renewable 
Energy Fund has not delivered any significant outcome either. This raises the 
question of whether these policies were targeting the most important constraints, 
and if they were politically viable. 
2.2 Kenya
Kenya is positively perceived by donors and investors as a target country for 
renewable energy investments because of its market-friendly approach to 
development (Newell and Phillips 2016). Kenya initiated power sector reform 
processes in 1996 which saw the establishment of an independent regulator and 
the unbundling and liberalisation of the electricity sector. It was the first country in 
SSA to attract a significant number of IPPs through international competitive bids 
(Eberhard et al. 2016). The national distribution and generation utilities, Kenya 
Power (KPLC) and Kengen, were partially privatised and are now profitable. The 
off-taker (i.e. purchaser of electricity), Kenya Power, has never defaulted on a 
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and has developed the capacity to effectively 
negotiate with the private sector. Electricity tariffs are cost-reflective and efficient, 
and there is an affordable lifeline tariff for consumption below 50kWh per month. 
10 Press advertisement for Government of Ghana invitation for prequalification for 20MWp Solar PV 
IPP Project (GOG/MOP/20MWSP/2015/01), December 2015, www.dgmarket.com/tenders/np-notice.
do?noticeId=13529510. 
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The licensing process is transparent and key responsibilities for planning, 
tendering and contracting are well defined (Kapika and Eberhard 2013). 
Kenya has shown commitment and consistency in planning processes, both 
to increase electrification rates and the expansion of renewable energy (World 
Bank 2014). As opposed to many other countries in SSA, electricity supply is not 
considered the main constraint to business growth by Kenyan firms, which are 
more concerned by issues like informality, corruption and political instability (World 
Bank 2013c).
Despite all these positive features and sentiments from investors and donors, 
Kenya has one of the lowest rates of access to electricity in SSA. In 2013, 
35 million Kenyans, i.e. 80 per cent of the population, did not have access to 
electricity (IEA 2015). The access rate in rural areas was as low as 7 per cent. The 
situation has improved in recent years and connectivity rates had increased to 
50 per cent by the end of 2015, according to data by the national distribution utility 
Kenya Power (KPLC 2015). Kenya Power has set a target to connect over one 
million new customers every year to achieve 70 per cent electrification by 2017 
and universal access by 2020 (Lahmeyer International 2016). Grid extension is the 
preferred approach to provide access to electricity in Kenya because more than 
90 per cent of the population live within reach of the grid (KPLC 2015; Parshall 
et al. 2009). However, only a small share of households within the proximity of 
distribution lines are connected (Lee et al. 2016).
Significant problems to increasing connectivity are that grid connection costs are 
too high relative to rural incomes, and consumption levels remain very low even 
when connections are made. These problems have been addressed to some 
extent by small stand-alone solar PV systems that provide a basic electricity 
service at a low cost (Pueyo 2015; IED 2013; Zeyringer et al. 2015). These 
systems have proliferated in rural communities and Kenya is now the largest 
market for solar PV home systems in SSA, and the second largest for small solar 
lighting systems, after Tanzania (REN21 2016). More recently, donors have been 
interested in mini-grids because they enable more energy services and hence 
more income-generation opportunities.11 However, unsubsidised private mini-grids 
are unaffordable for most of the rural population (Carbon Africa et al. 2015). 
The Kenyan electricity system is very small, with only 2,404MW of installed 
capacity to serve a population of 46 million in 2015. In the past, over-reliance 
on hydropower combined with poor hydrology put the system under severe 
stress. To open up the sector to new technologies and sources of finance, Kenya 
embarked in a power sector reform process in the mid-1990s. Five thermal plants 
mainly running with heavy fuel oil (HFO) were commissioned (four remain today), 
which led to significant price increases. Additionally, two geothermal plants were 
commissioned in the early 2000s (Eberhard et al. 2016). Severe drought affected 
the country in the 2000s and the government commissioned up to 200MW of 
expensive emergency power plants (EPPs), but these have now been reduced to 
30MW. Besides, Kenya put in place a long-term programme for the development of 
geothermal power and is now the largest producer of geothermal energy in Africa. 
11 See for example DFID’s ‘Green Mini-Grids Africa’ https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203990 
or GIZ’s ‘Promotion of solar-hybrid minigrids’ www.giz.de/en/worldwide/25332.html. 
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Since 2014, the Kenyan system has added significant geothermal and HFO thermal 
capacity and plans to dramatically increase the share of wind power, mainly through 
a new 300MW wind power farm in the Lake Turkana area. The development of 
this and three smaller wind farms would increase the share of variable renewable 
energy generation capacity in Kenya’s grid from 1 per cent in 2015 to 18 per cent by 
2019. This may pose problems to the stability of the power system, mainly due to 
inexperience in managing large shares of intermittent generation.
The national development strategy approved in 2008 (known as Vision 2030) 
placed electricity at the centre of industrial and social development (Republic 
of Kenya 2007). The programme 5000+MW was launched in 2013 with the 
aim of bringing 5,000MW of capacity online within 40 months. The strategy 
prioritised indigenous resources, mainly geothermal, but also wind and coal, and 
potentially gas. The approval of FiT and Vision 2030 in 2008 saw an explosion 
in unsolicited proposals for wind power plants approved for development, with 
510MW committed until 2022, but implementation has been slow. Since then, 
only 700MW out of the promised 5,000MW have been added to the system. While 
this falls short of the government’s ambition, it is considered sufficient to meet 
Kenya’s current demand. In effect, the most recent generation and transmission 
Master Plan describes a situation of overcapacity: ‘Kenya is one of the few African 
countries with sufficient available generation capacity to meet demand and plenty 
of projects in the planning stage’ (Lahmeyer International 2016: 3). 
In spite of having sufficient capacity at the current time, the quality of the electricity 
provided by the national grid is poor and consumption levels are very low. 
Transmission and distribution networks are weak and overloaded, and electrical 
outages are common. In the last World Bank Enterprise Surveys (World Bank 
2013c), for example, Kenyan firms reported an average of 6.3 electrical outages 
in a typical month, lasting an average of 5.6 hours and causing a 5.6 per cent 
loss in annual sales. Interestingly, 57.4 per cent of firms own a generator, which 
indicates the inability of the grid to provide electricity when it is needed. Besides, 
the fast penetration of large-scale wind power plants in the system and an 
inflexible interconnection with Ethiopia may pose further stability challenges. This 
could require reserve capacity from hydro, gas, medium speed diesel or flexible 
interconnections with neighbouring countries (Lahmeyer International 2016). 
Kenya has therefore implemented successful policies to attract investment in 
green generation capacity but still faces two major challenges: low connectivity 
rates and poor quality of access. Through our diagnostics we seek to identify 
successful elements of Kenya’s landscape for investment in renewable energy as 
well as constraints to a more inclusive, scalable supply of renewable electricity. 
These would include a more diversified renewable generation mix (geographically 
and technologically) which is adapted to the characteristics of demand (affordable 
and scalable as demand grows). 
2.3 Summary
The electricity sectors of Kenya and Ghana represent the many challenges that 
countries in SSA encounter as they try to build green and inclusive economies. 
Both countries aim at providing universal access to affordable electricity, fostering 
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economic growth and reducing the vulnerability of their power systems to erratic 
rainfall patterns and imported fuels. Climate change commitments also require 
cleaner generation technologies. Renewable energy can jointly contribute to 
energy security and environmental sustainability.
Both Kenya and Ghana have looked for a least cost, local, long-term way out of 
hydropower dependence. Kenya has championed geothermal power as a secure, 
least cost and clean energy source. It is now the leading geothermal power 
supplier in Africa. Ghana has instead sought to develop its domestic gas resources 
to fuel its power plants, while renewables have been relegated to a minor role. 
However, gas exploitation has been slow and local gas will not be adequate to 
meet the country’s gas requirements for the medium-to-long term. In the short 
term, to deal with power supply crises, both countries have locked themselves 
into contracts with private thermal plants using imported fuel. This has proved 
expensive and vulnerable to the volatility of fossil fuel prices and unreliable supply, 
such as in the case of Ghana’s dependence on Nigerian gas. 
The focus of diagnostics in Ghana is first to understand constraints to investment 
in all types of generation technologies, given the large deficit of capacity in the 
country; and then to understand what prevents renewables from being a key 
element of Ghana’s energy security strategy.
In Kenya, the focus is to understand the constraints to a more flexible electricity 
system that includes different types of renewable energy diversified geographically, 
as well as constraints that prevent further access to electricity. 
The current situation of both countries shows, in the end, tensions between the 
universality of access to electricity and its financial viability between the short-term 
relief of electricity supply crises and sustainable long-term solutions. 
3 The Green Investment Diagnostics 
methodology
The evolution from the original Growth Diagnostics to the Green Investment 
Diagnostics approach is described in our previous publication (Spratt et al. 2016). 
In this section we describe the logical decision tree framework and the four 
diagnostic signals we use to identify the key areas of policy intervention most likely 
to remove obstacles to investment in renewable technologies. 
The Green Investment Diagnostics approach starts with a clear understanding of 
the state of investment in renewable energy in the target countries. Is there a lack 
of investment in the power sector as a whole or only in renewable generation? Are 
there periods of intense activity or stagnation? Is the country investing in least cost 
generation or taking suboptimal decisions? Answering these questions points at 
technologies where investment is less than would be expected given the country 
context and relative economic and financial attractiveness. 
Having identified renewable energy technologies where investment has been 
historically low in the country, but potential is high, we ask: for this country, at this 
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particular time, what is preventing higher levels of investment in renewable 
generation technologies for which there is an economic rationale? Our decision 
tree then offers several alternatives, or branches, to explain low levels of 
investment. Three different sources underpin the branches of our decision 
tree: (i) the original Growth Diagnostics decision tree (Hausmann et al. 2004); 
(ii) a review of the literature about constraints to investment in renewable energy 
in developed and developing countries (Pueyo et al. 2015); and (iii) interviews 
with investors, regulators, representatives of the financial sector, academics and 
practitioners (a list of interviewees is provided in Appendix A).
The two initial branches to explain the low level of investment are: (i) investment 
returns are not attractive enough relative to alternatives; or (ii) the sorts of finance 
needed are not available. Of course, it is possible that both these problems exist, 
or that they are interconnected. Investments may be unattractive if profits are too 
low after high interest rates are paid. On the other side, debt financiers may require 
high interest rates if the project’s risks are very high. This is the main explanation 
for why our approach may result in more than one ‘binding constraint’. 
We look at project attractiveness and finance availability separately in the next level 
of the decision tree. Projects may be considered unattractive for two reasons: returns 
are too low or risks are too high. Finance supply (long-term, low-cost debt finance) 
may be low because there is not enough capital available, or capital is potentially 
available but is not allocated efficiently by the financial system. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
these initial nodes of the Green Investment Diagnostics decision tree.
Decisions about which constraint to investigate further at each node are informed 
by the country’s performance in several related indicators as compared to 
other countries or to international benchmarks. As well as direct quantitative 
comparisons, we also rely on interviews to interpret these indicators.12 Qualitative 
methods are particularly useful to identify the relationships between different 
constraints, and their relative importance from the perspective of investors and 
other stakeholders such as regulators or financiers.
As potential problem areas are ruled out, we are left with a small number of areas 
which the evidence suggests may be the most important constraint, and a growing 
12 See list of interviewees in Appendix A.
Figure 3.1 First nodes of the Green Investment Diagnostics decision tree
Source: Author’s own; drawing from Hausmann et al. (2004).
Problem: Suboptimal investment in renewable energy
Unattractive investments
Low returns High risks Inadequate access 
to savings
Poor intermediation
Insufficient supply of suitable finance
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understanding of why. Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 look in detail at the possibilities 
open at each side of the decision tree: project attractiveness and finance 
availabilities. We identify indicators to assess the importance of different constraints. 
3.1 Are renewable energy investments attractive enough?
As described above, investments could be unattractive if they provide insufficient 
returns or if their risks are too high (or both). 
We start by looking at the returns branch of the decision tree. To assess the 
sufficiency of returns we compare the equity internal rate of return (IRR) of 
renewable energy generation projects to the opportunity cost of funds.13 The 
opportunity cost is the return yield of potential investment alternatives. For an 
unconstrained international investor, this would be the returns obtainable in the 
global equity and bond markets. For investors with a regional or sectoral scope, 
their opportunity costs would be the return of investments in these markets. 
If we see that returns are not competitive with alternatives, the next question is why 
this is. Moving down the decision tree to the next level, we again face two possible 
explanations: returns may be insufficient because project costs are too high or 
revenues too low. Figure 3.2 shows the different sub-branches following signs of 
low returns in the project. Low returns may result from high costs of renewable 
energy generation or from low revenues. 
High costs of renewable energy generation plants could relate to either the plant 
itself or the system. To capture project-level costs, we use the levelised cost 
13 The methodology to estimate equity IRR of renewable energy projects is described in Pueyo, 
Bawakyillenuo and Osiolo (2016).
Figure 3.2 Unattractive investments due to low returns
Source: Authors’ own.
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of energy (LCOE) of renewable energy plants and compare it to international 
benchmarks for renewable energy and to the LCOE of fossil fuel-based plants in 
the country.14 If the LCOE appears high as compared to international benchmarks, 
we will investigate further. Is the problem with operations and maintenance 
(OandM) and resource supply costs, or is the cost of financing the issue? When 
financing costs are driving up the cost of renewables, we will also investigate what 
is causing them, through the financial branch of the decision tree, which will be 
further analysed in Section 3.2
System costs are those that a single generation plant imposes on the electricity 
system as a whole (IEA 2010). These include the costs of transmission and 
distribution infrastructure required for grid connection and the cost of operating 
and planning reserve for intermittent renewables.15 To assess this we look at the 
following parameters: 
i The generation share of intermittent renewable energy projects in the country 
(it is often stated that if renewable penetration is higher than 20 per cent by 
energy it may pose challenges to the system);16 
ii the geographic and technology diversification of existing renewable energy 
(more diversification reduces system costs); 
iii the availability of dispatchable backup capacity and storage in the country 
(mainly hydro reserves and gas turbines); 
iv the availability of interconnections with neighbouring countries;
v the reach of the grid infrastructure compared to the location of renewable 
resources; and
vi the responsibility for paying the transmission costs of a specific project.17 
If the analysis suggests that high costs are not the cause of low returns, the 
explanation must be that revenues are too low. There are a number of possible 
explanations for this, each of which would require a very different policy solution. 
Renewable resources available in the country may not be of high enough quality, 
or the technologies used may be inefficient. Prices could be too low to generate 
sufficient revenues, or demand could be insufficient. The risk of curtailment of 
intermittent renewable energy could also be jeopardising revenue generation. 
14 The concept of LCOE and the methodology to calculate it is described in Pueyo et al. (2016).
15 Reserve capacity is a measure of available capacity over and above the capacity needed to meet 
normal peak demand levels. The reserve capacity should be available to the system operator within 
a short interval of time to meet demand in case a generator goes down or there is another disruption 
to the supply.
16 Countries in Europe such as Denmark, Ireland or Spain have achieved much larger shares than 
this 20 per cent by energy, stabilising the grid with trade with neighbouring countries or with flexible 
generation sources (IRENA 2015a).
17 For example, in Germany the costs of transmission are borne by the transmission system operators 
and charged to the federal grid agency of Germany (Klessmann, Nabe and Burges 2008). In many 
other countries, grid connectivity to the nearest substation needs to be borne by the project developer 
and grid access is not always guaranteed, which can significantly increase the cost of a project.
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Table 3.1 Indicators of constraints related to low returns
Constraint Indicator Source of data
Returns Equity IRR Individual project data, or information in national 
generation planning documents
Country government bond yields National banks
Several investment indices FTSE, SandP, MSCI, Bloomberg
Project costs LCOE of the project/technology in the 
country (USD cents/kWh)
Individual project data, or information in national 
generation planning documents
International LCOE benchmarks 
(USD cents/kWh)
IRENA (2015c)
LCOE of fossil fuel-based generation 
in the target country (USD cents/kWh)
National generation planning documents
Installed costs Unit investment costs (USD/kW) Individual project data, or information in national 
generation planning documents
International benchmarks of unit 
investment costs
IRENA (2015c)
OandM costs OandM as a share of capital costs Individual project data, or information in national 
generation planning documents
Resource costs Cost of biomass or geothermal 
resource, when the generator has to 
pay to a supplier
Individual project data
Financing costs Cost of debt Individual project data, national banks, international 
debt suppliers
System costs Share of intermittent renewable 
energy in the country (% capacity)
National generation planning documents
Geographic and technological 
diversification of IRE in the country 
National generation planning documents
Share of dispatchable generation 
– % generation from natural gas, 
hydropower, HFO and biomass 
National generation planning documents
Connectivity – % of population 
connected to the grid
National distribution utility or IEA energy access 
statistics (OECD/IEA 2015)
Responsibility for transmission costs National energy regulator
Prices Regulated tariffs National energy regulator
Directly negotiated PPAs National energy regulator
Feed-in tariffs National energy regulator
Demand GDP growth (%) World Development Indicators 
Standard deviation of GDP growth 
(2006–14)
Calculation with data from World Development 
Indicators
Poverty headcount ratio at USD1.90 
per day (2013)
World Development Indicators 
Poverty growth (2006–13) Calculation with data from World Development 
Indicators
Interconnections exist National transmission utility
Exports/total generation (2015) National energy statistics
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This refers to the possibility that all the electricity produced by intermittent 
generators cannot be fed into the system. The risk of curtailment is higher in 
systems with low baseload consumption of electricity, insufficient transmission 
capacity, low interconnection and an inflexible generation mix. In each case, 
indicators are derived to measure and compare performance. Table 3.1 presents 
the indicators used to measure and compare the performance of projects or 
countries related to the returns of renewable energy. 
Projects with high returns could still be unattractive if they face high risks. 
Investment in renewable energy technologies is particularly vulnerable to a risky 
environment because they tend to be very capital intensive. Therefore they 
require a long-run, assured revenue stream. A number of risks can jeopardise 
the future revenue stream, including: regulatory risks; off-taker risks; resource 
and technology risks; macroeconomic risks; social and reputational risks and 
governance risks. Figure 3.3 shows the ramifications of the decision tree that relate 
Table 3.1 Indicators of constraints related to low returns (cont.)
Constraint Indicator Source of data
Quality of RE 
resource
National RE resource potential
Capacity factors of RE plants* Individual project data, or information in national 
generation planning documents
Risk of 
curtailment
Baseload consumption National energy statistics
Transmission capacity National transmission planning documents
Flexibility of generation mix As in indicators of system costs
* Low capacity factors show that power plants are not operational for a large share of the time and hence cannot 
sell a lot of power. 
Source: Authors’ own.
Figure 3.3 Unattractive investments due to high risks
Source: Authors’ own.
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to high risks. This illustrates the process through which the decision tree approach 
is operationalised. If there is evidence suggesting that off-taker risk is particularly 
important, we look more closely to assess what is undermining the financial 
viability of the company. Is it mainly a liquidity issue, for example, or is it a more 
fundamental problem of operating performance? The policy response would clearly 
be very different depending on the answer to this question. The remainder of this 
section describes the diagnostic process for assessing the relative importance of 
investment risks. 
Power sector regulation and market access
Well-designed, transparent and enforceable regulation is required at every stage 
of the development of a renewable energy generation project, particularly if it is 
connected to the national grid. Electricity providers need predictable plans for the 
extension of the national system and enforceable regulation that protects: (i) their 
property rights; (ii) their right to feed the power they produce to the national grid; 
(iii) their ability to sell electricity at a predictable price that allows for cost recovery; 
and (iv) them from the risk of non-payment. Challenges in all these areas are 
widespread in SSA. 
Constraints at the planning stage arise when the government is unable to predict 
the generation, transmission and distribution capacity and interconnections that 
will be needed to meet future demand. Further potential problems arise when 
grid expansion and off-grid initiatives are not coordinated and if there are no clear 
links between the capacity needs highlighted in national generation expansion 
plans and what is actually procured. Effective planning requires adequate 
systems, human resources and institutional capacity, and is best undertaken 
with an integrated resource planning framework.18 Traditional planning systems 
need to take into account issues that are particular to renewables, such as the 
intermittency of supply in some cases, the time it takes to build renewable energy 
plants or the time required to obtain finance. Demand forecasting also needs to be 
drastically improved through bottom-up approaches that take into account how the 
demand of customers in different rural locations will evolve (Chattopadhyay, Kitchlu 
and Jordan 2014). 
Constraints at the procurement stage arise from a lack of competition among 
suppliers; unclear procurement responsibilities; and lengthy and opaque permitting 
processes. Opportunities for corruption are reduced when: procurement is linked to 
national planning; PPAs are granted by a unique transparent authority; and when 
the permitting process is streamlined, keeping the number of permits required 
and the time needed to grant them to the minimum. A recent source of transaction 
costs for utilities and regulators in Africa has been the increase in unsolicited 
proposals from private developers to build renewable energy generation plans. 
As opposed to competitive tenders, unsolicited proposals occur when private 
developers take the lead in proposing new generation plants to the national 
utility or the government agency in charge of issuing PPAs. Individual company 
18 Integrated resource planning is defined as a ‘utility plan for meeting forecasted annual peak and energy 
demand, plus some established reserve margin, through a combination of supply-side and demand-
side resources over a specified future period’ (Wilson and Biewald 2013: 4).
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decisions typically determine system expansion in market-based decentralised 
power systems. However, in small African power systems, an increase of 
unsolicited proposals can clog the permitting and contracting functions and lead to 
a long list of projects in the pipeline waiting for approval. An obvious solution is to 
procure plants through organised tendering (Eberhard et al. 2016).
Constraints at the contracting stage arise when PPAs do not reassure investors 
that they will be able to recover their investment and obtain a reasonable profit. 
Some attractive clauses that may help in this regard include: long-term price 
guarantees; foreign currency denomination;19 guaranteed access to the national 
grid; priority dispatch;20 and take-or-pay clauses (OPIC et al. n.d.).21 At the same 
time, regulators and off-takers need to ensure that contracts do not become so 
generous that they undermine least cost electricity supply. 
Negotiating renewable energy contracts is complex and requires a great deal 
of expertise from both the government side and private sponsors. African 
19 Payments in foreign currency protect the investor against the devaluation of the local currency. This is 
important because debt and equity usually need to be returned in foreign currency. 
20 Priority dispatch ensures that renewables are fed before fossil fuels when demand is lower than supply. 
21 Take-or-pay clauses oblige the off-taker (or purchaser of electricity) to purchase all power agreed in the 
contract or otherwise provide a compensation. 
Table 3.2 Indicators of constraints related to power sector regulatory risk
Constraint Indicator Source of data
Planning Number of RE projects in the pipeline 
(waiting for permits, or with permits but 
waiting for PPAs)
National energy regulator
Comparison of required capacity in 
past planning documents and projects 
that have actually been built
Past national generation 
capacity planning document 
and current electricity 
generation statistics
Procurement Number of projects and MW procured 
through competitive bids
National energy regulator
Number of steps and licences required 
to generate electricity from renewable 
sources
National energy regulator
Contracting Length of RE price guarantee Individual PPA or FiT policy
Adjustments for exchange rate and 
inflation risk 
Individual PPA or FiT policy
Access to grid guaranteed by law Individual PPA or FiT policy
Connection cost covered by utility National energy regulator and 
individual project data
Market access Per cent of generation capacity 
controlled by the state
National electricity generation 
statistics, or planning 
documents with ownership 
data for each power plant
Source: Authors’ own.
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governments often lack this expertise. Some symptoms of constraint at the 
contracting stage include precedents of PPAs not having been honoured; PPAs 
that do not ensure ‘bankability’ of projects; frequent changes to electricity tariffs; 
and a wide spread between FiT and national electricity retail tariffs, which would 
point at political pressures to keep prices low. 
Constraints to access the power market arise when the sector is highly 
concentrated in the hands of state-owned utilities and there is no clear criteria for 
allocation of investment opportunities between private and public actors (Malgas 
and Eberhard 2011). Even if the legal framework allows for access to the grid 
for private generators, long delays in obtaining permits and grid connection may 
effectively prevent entry. 
To summarise, regulatory risk is an extremely important issue in the power sector, 
given the importance of regulation in shaping markets and ensuring that they 
function properly. Table 3.2 shows the indicators we use to recognise the most 
important potential constraints. The fact that renewable energy may require public 
financial support for the life-time of a project complicates things further. The 
credibility of the government in the eyes of investors is therefore crucial. 
Creditworthiness of the off-taker
The off-taker is the purchaser of electricity from power generation plants. National 
distribution companies typically play this role in Africa. When off-takers are not 
financially sound, generators face a high risk of not being paid and financiers are 
reasonably reluctant to back their projects. Several financial challenges make 
African electricity distribution companies unreliable payers. Retail electricity prices 
are often lower than the wholesale price of electricity charged by generators, 
for example. In addition, customer default rates are often high, billing processes 
may be ineffective, while large losses can result from poor network system 
maintenance. 
The annual reports and financial statements of electricity utilities provide detail 
on their financial health as well as insights into the reasons for poor performance. 
A first sign of trouble, for example, is the lack of recent, audited accounts with a 
positive opinion from the auditors. Table 3.3 describes several indicators that can 
be extracted from utilities’ annual reports to identify potential constraints. 
Firstly, operational performance refers to the process of purchasing, delivering 
and invoicing electricity, as well as collecting bills to pay salaries and electricity 
providers. The goal of a company is to maximise the surplus of receipts over 
disbursements and the speed of the cycle. EBITDA or EBIT margins (EBITDA or 
EBIT/sales) are indicators of the operating financial performance of the company 
and allow for a comparison between companies.22 While a negative EBITDA is 
a strong indication of financial distress, a positive EBITDA is not a guarantor 
of financial sustainability, as additional cash is needed to cover financing costs 
and reinvestment. The EBITDA margin observed for public service companies 
22 EBIT is Earnings Before Interest and Tax; EBITDA is Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortisation. Calculated as revenue minus expenses excluding interest and tax, depreciation and 
amortisation.
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in Europe is 20 per cent (Fritsch 2011). A study of EBIT margins for electricity 
and gas retailers in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries shows lower values, between 1 and 22 per cent, with a median 
EBIT margin of 12 per cent (London Economics 2012). We take these values as 
benchmarks to assess the operating sustainability of the off-taker. 
System losses, where power billed to consumers is lower than power purchased 
from generators, are an important cause of low operating margins. For example, 
the 2013 financial statements of Ghana’s distribution utility ECG present an 
operating loss and high system losses of 23 per cent of total power purchased 
contribute to this poor performance (ECG 2013a: 49). 
Secondly, liquidity risk is high when current liabilities are higher than current assets 
and the amount of cash and cash equivalents is low as compared to accounts 
payable and short-term borrowing. This may create liquidity problems and delays 
in payments to suppliers. 
Finally, credit risk arises when customers are unable to pay their bills in full. 
Financial statements usually show the aging of accounts receivable. A large share 
of receivables past their due date and in particular a large share of receivables due 
for over a year would point at a high credit risk. Some financial statements show 
the profile of customers whose bills are overdue. Often the state and state-owned 
companies fail to comply with their payment obligations, contributing to the 
precarious state of national electric utilities.
The financial structure of a company provides additional clues about its financial 
health. A large share of short-term debt relative to equity and long-term debt 
suggests financial stress. 
Table 3.3 Indicators of constraints related to the creditworthiness of the 
off-taker
Constraint Indicator Source of data
Operational performance EBIT (if positive, EBIT margin) Annual reports of distribution 
utilities
System losses
Liquidity Current liabilities/current 
assets
Cash and cash equivalents/
accounts payable and 
short-term borrowing
Credit risk Revenue collection to sales
Trade receivables past due by 
more than a year
Receivables from public 
institutions
Financial structure Short-term debt/equity and 
long-term debt
Source: Authors’ own.
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Resource supply and technology risk
Resource supply risks can arise from inaccurate assessments of renewable 
energy resources (Waissbein et al. 2013) or from unreliable resource suppliers, 
in the case of biomass or geothermal, for example. To mitigate these risks, public 
dissemination of robust resource assessments for each technology may be helpful. 
Suppliers of geothermal steam and biomass feedstock must be contractually 
obliged to provide a certain quantity and quality of resource and be financially and 
technically sound. 
Table 3.4 Indicators of constraints related to resource supply, technology, macroeconomic, 
social and governance risks
Constraint Indicator Source of data
Resource Resource assessments available National or international energy thinktanks, or 
national regulator
Technology Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education World Development Indicators
Competitive Industrial Performance Index UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance 
Reports
Grid capacity – enough transmission capacity 
to transmit projected generation
National transmission planning documents
Macroeconomic Currency risk – change in exchange rate 
(USD per local currency) 
National banks
Inflation – Consumer Price Index year-on-year National banks
Current account deficit National banks
Fiscal deficit National banks
Social Precedents of social discontent in renewable 
energy projects
Press
Clear social consultation guidelines National regulation on Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment
CIRI empowerment rights index (2011 is 
latest value)
CIRI Human Rights Dataset
Governance CPIA transparency, accountability and 
corruption in the public sector index (1 low – 
6 high)
World Development Indicators
CPIA property rights and rule-based 
governance index 2015
World Development Indicators
Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index (rank)
Transparency International
Percentage of firms expected to give gifts 
to secure a government contract
World Bank Enterprise Surveys
Percentage of firms expected to give gifts 
to obtain a construction permit
World Bank Enterprise Surveys
Intentional homicides per 100,000 World Development Indicators
Threat of terrorism Foreign Office country reports
Source: Authors’ own.
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Technology risks are likely to be high when the country has no previous experience 
in a particular technology, when its industry is not sufficiently developed to provide 
spare parts and knowledge, and when its workforce has not got the required skills. 
Table 3.4 shows the indicators used to identify constraints related to resource 
supply and technology risks, jointly with other types of constraints. 
Macroeconomic risks
The scale of capital requirements for power generation projects, compared to 
the immature or absent capital markets in many developing countries means that 
finance needs to be obtained internationally.23 As a result, debt and equity are 
usually denominated in foreign currency. In contrast, project revenues are usually 
denominated in local currency, creating significant currency risk. Large currency 
devaluations and/or high rates of inflation thus damage the viability of renewable 
energy projects as they diminish the real value of future revenues relative to 
liabilities to debt and equity investors. To capture these risks we use two indicators 
with direct impact on the returns to investment: inflation rates and annual changes 
in the official exchange rate of the local currency to USD. 
Social opposition and reputational risk
Due to its positive environmental connotations, public support for renewables 
is usually high in most countries. However, problems arise when moving from 
national to local acceptance. Community acceptance has proven to be a real 
block to the completion of renewable energy projects, as evidenced by projects 
experiencing delays or being abandoned due to conflict with local communities. In 
Kenya, for example, a 60MW wind power project recently had to halt construction 
as local farmers took to the streets and the court, making the site unsafe (Waruru 
2016). Social opposition has delayed or stopped wind farm development in other 
developed and developing countries, such as Mexico (Juarez-Hernandez and 
Leon 2014) and the UK (Cass and Walker 2009). 
Some particularities of renewable energy projects make them more exposed in this 
regard. They are smaller per project than fossil fuel plants, hence requiring more 
location decisions for an equivalent capacity. Their visual impact per unit of output 
(kWh) is also larger, and there is much less flexibility on where they can be located 
as they need to be where the best resources are (Wüstenhagen, Wolsink and 
Bürer 2007).24 
Questions of community acceptance and compensation are complicated when 
the current users of the land do not hold formal land titles, as is often the case in 
SSA. The lack of clarity over land rights also creates the possibility of rent seeking 
from local communities pursuing compensation for land they do not use. Project 
developers negotiating compensations to local stakeholders claiming cultural or 
23 Interviews with Aldwych International and GCP, 2015.
24 There are interesting differences between social acceptance in developed and developing context. For 
example, opposition to wind farms in developed countries mostly derives from their negative landscape 
impact. In developing countries the main concern is the impact to livelihoods of changes in access to 
land (Juárez-Hernandez and León 2014).
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livelihood-related entitlement to the land are often unable to differentiate legitimate 
from illegitimate claims.25 
The evidence suggests that community acceptance of projects depends on 
distributional justice (who bears costs and reaps benefits), procedural justice 
(opportunities for the local community to participate in decision-making) and trust 
in the project developers (Wüstenhagen et al. 2007).26 It is therefore very important 
that foreign project developers understand the local context if they are to avoid 
damaging relationships (Wüstenhagen et al. 2007; Hammami, Chtourou and 
Triki 2016).
Table 3.4 shows some indicators of potential social opposition risks that can be 
used at the national level. However, the risk of social opposition is better assessed 
at the project than the national level, as it depends on the characteristics of the 
local community, the project and the project developer.
Project developers also need to be cautious of the potential reputational damages 
of bad practices by their contractors. Reputational risks are higher in those regions 
with questionable human and labour rights records. We measure these through 
human rights and labour rights indices.
Governance risk
Many of the risks identified above are intimately related to governance. As a further 
piece of evidence on these areas, we also look at governance directly, using 
the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ indicators in the following areas: corruption; 
security; conflict; property rights; and rule-based governance ratings. 
Table 3.4 summarises all the indicators used to identify constraints in the areas of 
resource supply, technology, macroeconomic, social and governance risks.
Having considered potential constraints relating to the relative attractiveness of 
particular projects, the next section turns to the supply of finance. 
3.2 Is appropriate finance available?
It may be the case that even attractive renewable energy projects are unable to 
obtain the finance they need. Many firm surveys identify access to finance as a 
major constraint to investment. At the national level a low share of credit to the 
private sector and high financing costs may provide further evidence of financial 
constraints. At their heart, financial supply constraints result from either a lack of 
savings (domestic or external) or a failure of the financial system to allocate those 
savings (Hausmann et al. 2004).
25 Interviews with International EPC contractor and Aldwych International, 2015.
26 Communities are more favourable to projects when they are given full information about their costs and 
benefits and when they are involved in consultation and decision-making processes. Benefit-sharing 
mechanisms such as revenue sharing, jobs, lower electricity tariffs, investments in local infrastructure 
and public services also improve the chances of local acceptance. Clear policy frameworks detailing 
compensation requirements consulted with the local population also improve acceptance and reduce 
transaction costs for both parties.
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We start by looking at the decision tree branch related to an inadequate access 
to savings. Its ramifications are illustrated in Figure 3.4. As we did when looking 
at project attractiveness, a process of elimination results in some areas being 
ruled out. Where there is evidence to suggest that an area may be an important 
constraint, we engage in further investigation at more detailed levels of the 
decision tree. 
In principle, renewable energy projects can use domestic and foreign finance. In 
practice, foreign sources are essential in most developing countries, as domestic 
sources are insufficient for the level of investment required (Bazilian et al. 2011). 
We look in particular at the availability of two sources of foreign finance: foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and foreign aid for reasons of scale and data availability. 
Foreign aid can both provide funds directly and leverage private finance through 
blended finance-type models and political ‘insurance’ for private investors. Aid also 
shields the sector from the volatility of private investment and targets countries and 
technologies avoided or under-served by the private sector (Pueyo et al. 2015). 
While aid will remain crucial, however, the scale of the funding gap can only be 
addressed by a large increase in private investment. Causes for insufficient FDI 
include a bad business environment or direct restrictions through capital controls 
(Hausmann et al. 2004). 
As well as a shortage of external finance, problems may exist in terms of 
insufficient domestic finance. High domestic interest rates are a symptom of 
insufficient domestic finance, as they indicate a scarcity of supply relative to 
demand. As summarised in Figure 3.4, potential explanations range from limited 
domestic savings to a low level of tax collection, preventing public investment in 
infrastructure. In this regard, the low level of tax collection in SSA is considered 
as one of the greatest barriers to the transformation of the power sector (Africa 
Progress Panel 2015). 
Table 3.5 summarises the indicators used to identify constraints related to the 
insufficient supply of savings, both national and international. 
Figure 3.4 Insufficient finance due to inadequate supply of savings
Source: Authors’ own.
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Table 3.5 Indicators of constraints related to inadequate supply of savings
Constraint Indicator Source of data
Access to domestic 
savings
Gross domestic savings (% GDP) World Development Indicators
Gross capital formation (% GDP) World Development Indicators
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) Little Data Book on Financial 
Development 2015–16 (World Bank 
2015c)
Stock market capitalisation to GDP (%) Little Data Book on Financial 
Development 2015–16 (ibid.)
Low disposable 
income
GDP per capita (constant 2010 USD) World Development Indicators
Access to banking 
services
Commercial bank branches per 100,000 people Little Data Book on Financial 
Development 2015–16 (ibid.)
Bank accounts per 1,000 adults Little Data Book on Financial 
Development 2015–16 (ibid.)
Tax collection Tax revenue (% GDP) average last 5 years World Development Indicators
Foreign investment FDI, net inflows (% GDP) 2014 World Development Indicators
Ease of Doing Business (2016 rank) World Development Indicators
Portfolio equity, net inflows (% GDP) 2009 World Development Indicators
Aid Aid inflows, net ODA (% GNI) annual average 
2010–14
World Development Indicators
Net ODA received per capita (current USD) 
average 2010–14
World Development Indicators
Source: Authors’ own.
Figure 3.5 Insufficient finance due to poor intermediation
Source: Authors’ own.
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Rather than the underlying supply of finance, the inability to access finance on 
suitable terms may be a problem of financial intermediation. Well-functioning banks 
are competitive and stable, and able to provide long-term finance to promote 
investment and economic growth. Figure 3.5 summarises the issues of financial 
intermediation in decision tree form, illustrating the main categories and their more 
detailed potential causes, which will be further developed in this section.
A key indicator of intermediation problems is a wide spread between deposit 
and lending rates (Hausmann, Klinger and Wagner 2008). Wide spreads 
could be caused by lack of competition, high costs and bank-specific factors 
influencing risk preferences, and encouraging short-termism.27 Another important 
influence on banks’ willingness to lend long term at affordable rates is their own 
alternatives. Where banks can earn very high returns from short-term lending to 
the government, for example, it is not difficult to understand why they might be 
reluctant to lend for longer maturities with considerably higher risks. 
Low bank branch penetration and high sector concentration signal a problem of 
low competition. Bank pricing behaviour or market power indicators include the 
H-statistic, the Lerner index and the Boone indicator.28 All three indicators can be 
summarised as a composite measure of the competiveness of the banking sector 
as described in Table 3.6. If competition appears to be a problem, we explore 
potential causes through indicators of barriers to entry, ownership structure, activity 
restrictions and regulation. 
27 See World Bank article, ‘Banking Competition’: www.worldbank.org/en/publication/gfdr/background/
banking-competition.
28 The H-Statistic captures the elasticity of bank interest revenues to input prices. The Lerner index 
measures markups in banking, defined as the difference between output prices and marginal 
costs. The Boone indicator shows the elasticity of profits to marginal costs (www.worldbank.org/en/
publication/gfdr/background/banking-competition).
Table 3.6 Indicators of constraints related to poor intermediation
Constraint Indicator Source of data
Poor intermediation Bank lending–deposit spread 2015 Little Data Book on Financial 
Development 2015–16 (World Bank 
2015c)Competition Bank concentration (%) 2013
Boone indicator (2013)
Cost Bank overhead costs to total assets (%)
Risk and returns expectations Bank return on equity (% after tax) 2013
Bank non-performing loans to gross 
loans (%)
Stock market returns (% year-on-year)
Short-termism Syndicated loan average maturity 
(years) 2013
World Development Indicators
Average maturity on new external debt 
commitments (2014)
Source: Authors’ own.
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 83
36
If the problem is more an issue of banking efficiency than market competiveness, 
we would expect to see this reflected in costs. Indicators include overhead costs to 
assets, and bank cost to income ratio. 
Finally, the question of a potential short-term bias or high returns expectations is 
assessed through indicators of opportunities for short-term returns, as shown by 
liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding, short-term real interest rates, 
government bond yields, and short-term money market rates. 
3.3 Narrowing down constraints and positing a syndrome
The diagnostic processes described thus far are designed to highlight areas of 
potential concern by comparing performance in different areas with international 
peers and benchmarks. However, even if an area is identified as potentially 
problematic, this does not mean it is necessarily ‘binding’. A country may perform 
extremely badly in a particular area, but this may have little impact on investment 
incentives. It could also be the case that a country scores badly in many, or even 
most aspects. Which of them should be targeted first? 
As pointed out in Hausmann et al., ‘[I]t is seldom helpful to provide governments 
with a long list of reforms, many of which may not be targeted at the most binding 
constraints on economic growth’ (2004: 2). Governments could achieve more with 
less if they deploy their limited policymaking capital to relieve binding constraints. 
Prioritisation is therefore key to effectiveness and efficiency in policymaking. 
In order to assess how binding the first identified set of problems are, we gathered 
insights from actual investors, regulators and suppliers in the renewable energy 
value chain of the relevant country. We attempted a similar approach to that of 
Hausmann et al. (ibid.), according to which the presence of binding constraints 
would generate the following observable ‘symptoms’:
i The price (or shadow price) of the constraint should be high.
ii Historical movements in the constraint should have produced significant 
changes in the desired outcome. 
iii Agents in the economy should be attempting to overcome or bypass the constraint.
iv Agents less affected by the constraint are more likely to survive and thrive, and 
vice versa.
The (shadow) price of the constraint should be high 
When the constraint to investment is a shortage of supply – for example, finance, 
infrastructure, skills, confidence, stability – we would expect the price (whether 
market or shadow price) to be high. If the constraint is an insufficient supply of 
general finance, for example, we would expect to see very high real interest rates. 
If the problem was restricted to long-term finance, then interest rates for this type of 
finance should be high. If a lack of supporting infrastructure was binding, we would 
expect the infrastructure that did exist to generate high returns. If the issue was 
political risk, then premiums for political risk insurance would be likely to be very high. 
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This is not restricted to constraints with market prices. The problem may be a lack of 
skilled workers, a symptom of which would be high wages in relevant sectors. If the 
issue is excessive risk, we would expect to see this reflected in mitigation instruments 
like insurance premiums, sovereign guarantees or exchange rate hedging tools.
In practice, as noted by other practitioners (Felipe and Usui 2008) it was difficult to 
measure shadow prices and other evidence was required for judging the scarcity 
of resources. 
Movements in the constraint should produce significant change in the desired 
outcome 
We would expect to see significant impacts on renewable energy investments 
when a binding constraint is relaxed. Table 3.7 shows examples of interventions 
targeting particular constraints that would be likely to lead to an increase in 
renewable energy investment.
In each case, observation of a relationship between increases in the rate of 
investment and the factors in the right hand column would provide some evidence 
of potentially binding constraints. 
In practice, however, it was difficult to analyse the impact of relaxing constraints 
on actual investments. Data on investments in electricity generation in general 
Table 3.7 Examples of movements in constraints producing changes in outcome
If the constraint is… We would expect an increase in investment when…
Low electricity tariffs • Approval of FiT with premium prices• Approval of cost-reflective tariffs
Uncertain procurement processes Credible international competitive bids
Creditworthiness of the off-taker
• Improvement of the financial health of the purchasing utility
• Government or World Bank provide guarantees to cover for risk 
of non-payment
Uncertain planning Publication of credible power sector plans
Long and opaque permitting and contracting 
procedures
Approval of regulations streamlining permitting procedures, 
standardisation of PPAs
Lack of demand Fast GDP growth, interconnections with importing countries
Corruption Observable improvement in governance
Social opposition Peaceful periods, approval of laws and procedures that guarantee the rights of indigenous communities
High cost of finance Periods of lower real interest rates
Lack of international finance Periods of relatively high foreign capital inflows
Lack of foreign aid Periods of increased ODA influx
Lack of competition between banks Periods of greater competition
Lack of political will Government commits to (credible) renewable energy targets
Lack of political credibility Government adopts binding targets and provides guarantees
Source: Authors’ own.
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and renewable generation in particular are very lumpy because in small electricity 
systems investments in generation capacity are few and far between. Sometimes 
investments are under preparation for a long time before they actually take place. 
The large size of projects requires a variety of equity and debt investors, in 
addition to risk mitigation mechanisms such as partial risk guarantees provided 
by multilateral development banks. Getting all financial stakeholders on board 
takes time and financial closure cannot be attributed to the relaxation of a single 
constraint. After financial closure, it can take time for projects to start operations 
if they must wait for transmission lines to be finalised or to solve land property 
disputes, for example. For this reason, it would be impossible to attribute a peak 
in investment, which could be caused by a single project, to changes in a single 
specific constraint. We carried these tests by looking at the dates when projects 
became operational and comparing them to the performance of several indicators 
of constraints, but the results were not conclusive. 
Agents in the economy should be attempting to overcome or bypass the constraint
Where problems are serious, we would expect to observe firms trying to overcome 
them. For example, as noted in Hausmann et al. (2008) firms in India invest heavily 
in self-generation to bypass constraints in the national supply of electricity. Countries 
Table 3.8 Examples of behaviours to bypass constraints to renewable energy investment
Constraint Potential behaviour
Poor regulation for grid-
connected generators 
• Explosion of non-regulated off-grid small-scale generation, even in locations 
within reach of the national grid
• Self-generators do not sell excess to the grid
Electricity prices below cost 
recovery
• Self-generators do not sell excess generation to the grid
• Off-grid generators charge higher prices
• Electricity generators sell power directly to consumers
Unreliable off-taker
• Requirement of sovereign guarantees or partial risk guarantees (PRG) to 
back up PPAs
• Self-generators do not sell excess generation to the grid
Customers non-payment Prepayment schemes established by distribution company
Demand uncertainty Financiers demand take-or-pay clauses in PPAs
Political interference/vested 
interests/lack of political will Financiers and EPC contractors prefer government-backed (or state-owned) projects
Macroeconomic risk • Foreign currency denominated PPAs• PRG to cover for foreign exchange risk
Social opposition Significant expenses in social engagement plans and private security in sites
Lack of skilled technicians • Least sophisticated projects are implemented (i.e. solar PV plants, diesel gensets)• Large share of foreign staff in EPC and OandM
Lack of domestic savings Investors look for finance in international markets
Lack of infrastructure Projects located in areas next to transport and transmission infrastructure, even if they don’t have the best renewable resource
Lack of long-term finance High prices are charged to allow for a fast payback period
Source: Authors’ own.
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where labour market regulations are a binding constraint are likely to see higher than 
normal levels of informal employment. Countries where appropriability is low due 
to high taxes might see greater use of cash for business transactions, while a lack 
of capital from the financial system could cause firms to use more of their internal 
resources. For constraints specifically related to investment in the power sector, we 
detail some potential behaviours to bypass constraints in Table 3.8.
We were able to apply this type of non-price-related signals more naturally than 
the previous shadow prices and movements of constraints. Following up signals 
of actors bypassing constraints required in-depth knowledge of the countries’ 
power sectors, as well as creativity from the researcher. One of the main 
criticisms towards the Growth Diagnostics approach has been the absence of a 
scientific formula in its procedural application, which can lead to arbitrary choices 
of constraints by practitioners (Habermann and Padrutt 2011). In our case, we 
introduced a more systematic approach in the navigation of the decision tree but 
appreciated the freedom to test plausible stories through non-price signals. 
Agents less intensive in the constraint more likely to survive and thrive, 
and vice versa
While the presence of a constraint should encourage agents to avoid it, 
advantages will also be conferred on businesses that are less reliant upon it, and 
vice versa. Hausmann et al. describe this with an evocative metaphor:
What is the binding constraint to animals thriving in the Sahara desert? This is 
not unlike the question of what limits economic growth in a country. However, 
Table 3.9 Examples of those likely to thrive given particular constraints
Constraint Potential winners
Political interference/vested 
interests/lack of political will/
corruption
State-owned enterprises, investors with strong links to the government or the 
ruling elite
Social opposition Cooperatives, community-managed mini-grids, projects with a strong social component
Macroeconomic risks Suppliers being paid in foreign currency
Unreliable off-taker • Off-grid suppliers
• Suppliers with guaranteed income through sovereign guarantees or multilateral 
bank guarantees
Lack of capabilities Technologies that are simple to install and operate
Prices below cost recovery Power suppliers not subject to regulated tariffs
Lack of grid capacity Projects directly connected to the distribution network
Short-termism of finance 
supply
• Technologies with low upfront investment and high running costs (i.e. fossil 
fuel-based generation)
• Projects with a fast payback period
Lack of cheap and long-term 
finance
• Agents with easy access to affordable and long-term finance succeed in bringing 
projects to implementation (i.e. Chinese investors with access to Chinese 
development finance)
• Government-backed projects obtaining cheap finance from multilateral banks
Source: Authors’ own.
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in the Sahara, it is instructive to note that of those few animals that do thrive 
in that environment, a very large proportion are camels and a very small 
proportion are hippopotamus. The fact that the animals most intensive in the 
use of water, hippopotamus, are scarce while the animals least intensive in the 
use of water, camels, are thriving suggests that the supply of water may be a 
binding constraint to the spread of animals in the Sahara. 
Hausmann et al. (2008: 43–4)
Table 3.9 sketches what this might mean specifically for investment in renewable 
energy generation. 
We were also able to apply this test in our analysis of Kenya and Ghana, but as 
with actors bypassing constraints, it required in-depth knowledge of winners and 
losers in each country and the discretion of the researchers.
To summarise, our Green Investment Diagnostics approach first provides a 
reduced list of potential constraints to investment through the analysis of indicators 
following a decision tree. It then looks for symptoms that indicate they are binding. 
Some of the approaches to look for symptoms of constraint according to HRV are 
difficult to apply to small and complex energy systems (i.e. impact of movements 
in constraints or shadow prices). We look for symptoms mainly by observing 
how actors try to bypass constraints and what types of investments survive or 
perish. As the different tools are worked through, evidence supporting particular 
constraints builds cumulatively. The fact that this evidence comes from different 
sources provides further confidence. However, we were not able to reduce our 
focus to a single binding constraint as suggested in the original diagnostics. Links 
between different constraints are endless and singling one out is a challenging 
task. In fact, one important criticism of the Growth Diagnostics approach is the idea 
that an economy has a single most binding constraint that has to be addressed first 
(Habermann and Padrutt 2011). It might be better to reduce several constraints 
to some extent instead of focusing entirely on one, especially when there are so 
many interconnections between them.
In our analysis, we highlight a group of key obstacles to investment in renewables 
in each country, show their interrelationships and propose a theory or explanation 
for the existence of those particular constraints, what in Growth Diagnostics 
terminology is called a syndrome. In the next subsection, we explain our approach 
to recognise symptoms of binding constraints and to posit a syndrome that 
accounts for what we observed. 
Positing a syndrome
In Growth Diagnostics, a syndrome is a theory or an explanation for the existence 
of the particular constraints we observe. It is about understanding the root 
causes of the constraints. Hausmann et al. (2008) propose a non-exhaustive list 
of six syndromes that explain constraints to growth. Their proposed syndromes 
include four stories of government failure, in which an overburdened state may 
over-borrow, over-tax, underinvest or under-protect. Over-borrowing leads to a 
fiscal deficit that pushes interest rates up and where government borrowing crowds 
out the financial markets, causing low private investment at a high financial cost. 
Over-taxing reduces private returns discouraging investment. Underinvestment by 
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the state reduces the demand for investment even with low interest rates. In an 
under-protecting state, law and order collapses and investment risk is too high. 
Two additional syndromes describe external pressures that disrupt the export 
sector, jointly with the inability of the country to move to alternative products due to 
coordination and self-discovery obstacles. Finally, a syndrome of barriers to entry 
refers to situations where economic activity is reserved from some incumbents.
All these syndromes are relevant to our analysis. An over-borrowing state could 
subsidise electricity tariffs or fossil fuels damaging the financial viability of power 
utilities and the competitiveness of renewables, or crowding out private investment. 
An over-taxing state could reduce private returns to investment in renewables. 
Underinvestment in transmission and distribution infrastructure, for example, could 
discourage investment in generation. The uncertain future revenue streams will 
deter investors in an under-protecting state. External shocks and self-discovery 
problems could reduce the demand for electricity in the country, and hence 
investment needs. Finally, barriers to entry are clearly relevant in countries that 
have not abandoned the traditional centrally managed approach to power supply, 
and where state-owned utilities dominate the market.
4 Green Investment Diagnostics – 
Ghana
Section 2 described Ghana’s problem as one of underinvestment in all types of 
generation capacity, but particularly in renewable energy. The country has adopted 
a Renewable Energy Law, but it has not been duly implemented. Our diagnostics 
look for the main constraints to renewable energy investment by first asking if there 
is a shortage of attractive investments or instead a shortage of suitable finance for 
them. Further evidence is then accumulated to point at the main causes for one or 
another constraint.
4.1 Are renewable energy investments attractive?
Our previous research on costs and returns of hydro, wind and solar PV in 
Ghana showed low returns for wind and utility-scale solar PV in comparison to 
alternatives (Pueyo et al. 2016). Utility-scale solar PV is expected to deliver returns 
on equity of 9 per cent, based on the price per kWh set in the FiT and a 7.5 per 
cent debt interest rate (based on data provided by the EC).29 We estimated that 
a combination of low-cost debt from development banks (at around 4 per cent 
interest rate as enjoyed in other developing countries, such as Kenya) and low 
installed costs, such as those claimed by BXC solar, could allow equity rates of 
return of close to 22 per cent for solar PV.30 
29 Based on a FiT price of 17 USD cents per kWh guaranteed for a period of ten years, after which we 
assume a price of 13 USD cents per kWh, which is the cost of new gas power plants as provided in 
EC (2015a). 
30 BXC solar is a 20MW solar PV plant financed with Chinese capital and developed by Chinese 
contractors.
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Wind power plants could deliver equity rates of return of around 14 per cent but 
higher returns would be possible if installed costs were closer to lower international 
benchmarks (IRENA 2015c).31 Cost reductions could be achieved through learning 
effects and economies of scale. Hydropower, in contrast, would be expected to 
deliver very high returns, over 30 per cent, but the availability of hydrological 
resources in Ghana is highly uncertain.
The rates of return of wind and solar PV are relatively low compared to 
potential alternatives. Interviewed stakeholders suggested that projects in the 
telecommunications sector, or even treasury bills and bonds are more profitable 
than investments in renewable energy.32 For investors targeting the Ghanaian 
electricity sector, gas power plants are more profitable alternatives.33
Table 4.1 shows the rates of return of several investment indices, from more 
general to more specific geographic and sectoral indices. The table shows rates for 
both 2014 and the annual average for the period 2009–14, but average figures are 
more useful due to the volatility of these sectors.
Ghana’s government (GOG) bond yields, considered less risky than investing in 
a greenfield renewable energy project provide interest rates of 25.28 per cent, 
25.93 per cent and 23.49 per cent on the 91-day, 182-day bills and the three-year 
fixed bond as of the end of September 2015. Interest rates on the one-year, 
two-year note, three-year note, the five-year GOG bond and seven-year fixed 
31 At a FiT price of 15 USD cents per kWh guaranteed for ten years, after which it goes down to 
13 USD cents per kWh.
32 Interview with Executive Director of KITE, 2015.
33 Interview with Project Manager, Aldwych International, 2015.
Table 4.1 Rates of return of several investment indices in 2014 and as an average of the 
period 2009–14
Indices Value 2014 Value 2009–14
MSCI All Country World Index (ACWI) 2.47% 11.41%
SandP listed private equity - 16.54%
SandP Broad Market Index (BMI) 2.33% 12.11%
MSCI Frontier markets 1.84% 4.57%
SandP Pan Africa -14.74% 2.66%
FTSE/JSE All Africa 8.14% 15.23%
FTS/JSE Africa venture capital 42.64%
SandP Global oil and gas -30.32% 13.7%
SandP Global alternative energy -3.14% -2.2%
SandP Global clean energy -5.09 -9.68%
NYSE Bloomberg global solar 7.09 -1.53
NYSE Global wind 6.84 -1.13
Source: Authors’ own.
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bonds were 22.50 per cent, 23.00 per cent, 23.49 per cent, 21.00 per cent and 
18.00 per cent. These figures show that it is possible for investors to get good 
returns with lower risk than a greenfield renewable energy project in Ghana in 
broad diversified sectors, or very high returns with high risk as well for investments 
with Africa exposure. For investors with a focus on renewable energy, however, 
investments in Ghana are competitive with global alternatives. 
Costs
Our estimates of LCOE for renewable power plants show hydropower is the least 
cost technology in Ghana, at 7.9 USD cents per kWh (Pueyo et al. 2016). The 
LCOE of generic wind power is 14.3 USD cents per kWh and that of solar PV 
18.7 USD cents per kWh. These estimates use a social discount rate of 12 per 
cent as provided by national documents (EC 2015a. The Energy Commission has 
estimated that a 20MW solar PV plant recently developed by Chinese company 
BXC would require a price of 16.8 USD cents per kWh to break even, assuming a 
project life of 20 years, a discount rate of 10 per cent and a 15 per cent capacity 
factor (EC 2016a). 
The cost of a generic wind power plant in Ghana is higher than international 
benchmarks. Chinese wind projects reported 6 USD cents per kWh in 2014 and 
African projects around 10 USD cents per kWh (IRENA 2015c). Estimated costs 
of solar PV in Ghana are in line with 2014 international benchmarks for Africa, but 
far from the most competitive figures of around 6 USD cents per kWh reported in 
the latest South African renewable energy auctions (Eberhard and Kaberger 2016). 
These costs are still below the commissioned oil-based thermal plants to deal with 
the electricity supply crisis, at a LCOE of 19 USD cents per kWh (EC 2015a). 
The high costs of finance, high capital costs due to lack of experience and 
economies of scale and capacity factors below the international average appear 
to be behind the relatively high cost of wind power in Ghana compared to 
international benchmarks. Relatively high solar PV costs are also caused by high 
financing costs. Although these plants are lower cost than fossil fuel-based plants, 
there is a perception that ‘the economy needs cheap power from fossil fuels to 
develop’.34 
System costs are not a key constraint in Ghana at the present time. Although 
the Ghanaian system is very small, the penetration of intermittent renewables is 
negligible at the moment and is not expected to increase to a level that threatens 
system stability. The Ghanaian government’s target is to generate 10 per cent of 
electricity from renewable energy (excluding large hydro) by 2020. Only 4 per cent 
of that would be variable renewable energy that could raise system cost issues. 
The government has also shown a preference for solar PV below 20MW, which will 
allow geographic diversification. At the moment, nearly all generation comes from 
dispatchable hydro and fossil fuel-based thermal plants, the transmission network 
covers most of the country and there are good interconnections with neighbouring 
countries. These characteristics would provide system stability in the event of an 
increase in the share of variable renewable energy.
34 Interview with Head of Strategic Planning and Policy, Energy Commission 2015.
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Having looked at the cost of renewables in Ghana in comparison to fossil fuel 
alternatives and international benchmarks, we conclude that renewables can be 
competitive with the thermal plants that are being commissioned in the country. 
However, costs are above international benchmarks, mainly due to high financing 
costs. We now turn to look at the revenues. 
Revenues 
Revenues depend on the size of the demand, the price of electricity and the 
amount of electricity that can be generated and fed to the grid. 
First we look at demand for electricity, as a function of the rate of growth in 
the country, levels of poverty and inequality, as well as any external demand 
from other countries. Indicators for all these and a comparison with Kenya and 
international benchmarks are presented in Appendix B. Ghana’s GDP growth 
rate is higher than the average for SSA and for LMI countries, but it is much more 
volatile. Poverty rates are significantly lower than the average for SSA and have 
been falling. Households from all per centiles have benefited from growth in Ghana 
between 2005 and 2013, with the richest and poorest per centiles benefiting the 
most (GSS 2014). Finally, with regard to external demand, interconnections with 
neighbouring countries are available through the West African Power Pool. Ghana 
is currently a net electricity exporter to neighbouring countries Togo, Benin and 
Burkina Faso. Therefore, demand does not appear to be an important constraint to 
investment in renewable electricity.
Prices could well be an important obstacle to investment in all types of generation 
technologies, as Ghanaian retail tariffs are among the lowest in Africa. Figure B5 in 
Appendix B compares electricity tariffs in Kenya and Ghana, both retail tariffs and 
FiT. Ghanaian consumers, regulators and politicians are used to very low costs 
due to its traditional reliance on old – but cheap – hydroelectric plants. As a result, 
price rises tend to be met with strong social opposition.35 Although price rises are 
essential for financial sustainability, the government appears to have prioritised 
popular support over the financial viability of the electricity sector, frustrating efforts 
by the regulator to raise tariffs. In any case, price increases were granted recently 
to avoid the collapse of electricity utilities. In addition to low tariffs, the rapid fall in 
the value of the local currency, which has lost more than 50 per cent of its value 
against the US dollar in the last few years, makes it difficult for the distribution 
company to pay IPPs whose prices are dollar denominated (ECG 2013b). 
The government supports a subsidy to residential consumers in the lowest 
electricity consumption band. The scheme is effectively a cross-subsidy from 
non-residential and wealthier residential consumers to poorer residential 
consumers. This has raised opposition among large consumers of the national 
distribution company Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), which feel unfairly 
treated compared to industrial customers which are directly connected to the 
transmission network. To retain these high revenue-yielding industrial consumers 
ECG has negotiated lower tariffs, further damaging the financial sustainability of the 
tariff scheme (these issues are further discussed in the ‘Off-taker risks’ subsection). 
35 Interview with CEO of GCP, 2015.
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As a result of these tensions to keep prices low, there is a wide divergence between 
generation costs (average market cost and spot market price) and final prices 
(so-called composite bulk generation charge in Ghanaian regulation). The current 
transmission and distribution charges are also insufficient to allow the transmission 
company GRIDCo (Ghana Grid Company Ltd) and the distribution company ECG 
to recover their costs and both utilities have requested the regulator Public Utilities 
Regulatory Commission (PURC) an upward review of their tariffs (ECG 2013b).36
Ghana has approved a FiT scheme for renewable energy generation that offers 
fees at least twice as high as retail tariffs guaranteed for ten years. However, FiT 
offer a poor reassurance to investors as the time guarantee is just for ten years 
and they denominated in local currency. They do not offer investor protection 
against foreign exchange risks or inflation, which have escalated in the last years 
(PURC 2014). Besides, ECG’s poor credit record makes investors wonder if it is 
capable of honouring the guarantee. 
The third element influencing revenues is the amount of electricity that can be 
generated by each renewable energy project. This is reflected by the capacity 
factors of the plants, which measure the share of the time when plants are 
generating electricity. Capacity factors for wind and solar PV in Ghana are below 
African and international average values. Average wind power plants capacity 
factors are 25 per cent in Ghana (according to information provided by the EC), as 
compared to 32 per cent in Africa and 30 per cent internationally. Average capacity 
factors for solar PV are 15 per cent as compared to 22 per cent in Africa and 
20 per cent internationally (Pueyo et al. 2016). 
The final element that determines the revenues of intermittent renewable 
generation projects is the risk of curtailment. This is considered low in Ghana 
because the FiT scheme includes a renewable energy purchase obligation, there 
is a high share of flexible generation in the Ghanaian system, and sufficient 
transmission capacity and interconnections. 
Having looked at the returns of renewable energy in Ghana, we conclude that 
these are not high enough compared to alternatives in other sectors and regions. 
However, they would be acceptable for investors focused on the renewable energy 
sector. High financing costs, low prices and low capacity factors explain low returns. 
We now look at the risks that renewable energy investors face in Ghana, including 
regulatory, off-taker, resources and technology, macroeconomic, social and 
governance risks. 
Regulatory risks
We start by looking at the planning stage of the regulatory process. Ghanaian strategic 
energy plans have been unrealistic in the past, and have often not been implemented, 
36 GRIDCo advert: Proposed Transmission Service Charge for 2015 Major Tariff Review; see  
www.gridcogh.com/en/posts/gridco-advert---2015-tariff-proposal-summary-51.php.
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increasing uncertainty for investors.37 A symptom of the inefficiency of the planning 
process is the large number of plants that are awaiting permits or finance. In 2016, 
82 unsolicited renewable energy projects totalling nearly 6,600MW of capacity had 
obtained provisional wholesale supply and generation licences.38 These include 
very large flagship projects, such as the 155MW Nzema solar PV plant, which are 
unlikely to be built any time soon. Renewable energy plants in the pipeline more than 
double the current capacity of the Ghanaian system and broadly exceed the caps and 
targets set for renewables in the Renewable Energy Act. They evidence the lack of 
coordination between the planning and procurement functions in the country. 
The permitting procedures are also inefficient and opaque. Project developers 
need to engage with a number of institutions to get licences, clearances, 
assurances and incentives.39 Each of these steps increases transaction costs 
and gives opportunities for rent seeking, an issue that came up strongly in our 
interviewees to Ghanaian stakeholders:
At every step there are officials trying to get personal advantage out of the 
project and if you do not meet their demands the project is delayed and 
delayed and delayed. 
(Managing Director, Upwind, 2015) 
To get a PPA in Ghana you need to know a politician or a big person to take 
you through the process. 
(Deputy Executive Director, ACEP, 2015)
Our regulators are in the taking business not in the giving business. 
(Founder, Solar Light Company, 2015)
As well as the sheer number of licences and permits, many expire after a year, but 
it takes much longer than this to secure financing, so investors need to pay a high 
fee to renew their licences and are only allowed to do so once.40 
In addition to bureaucratic difficulties, there are problems with institutional design 
and the division of responsibility. For example, the role of the technical and 
37 For example, the 2006 plan by the EC forecasted supply requirements of 14,150–14,828GWh. Gross 
electricity supplied in 2014 was just 12,906GWh. It also anticipated that by 2013–15 there would be 
200MW of wind, 80MW of municipal solid waste, 10MW of biomass, solar PV and mini-hydro and 4MW 
of landfill gas capacity, none of which is available today (EC 2006, 2015b).
38 EC website, accessed November 2016.
39 The following licences, approvals, agreements and clearances are required from different institutions 
(EC 2012; IRENA 2015b): (1) Site clearance by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
Energy Commission; (2) Environmental permit from EPA; (3) No-objection in principle from the PURC; 
(4) Memorandum of understanding with the off-taker (e.g. ECG); (5) Provisional wholesale electricity 
supply licence, by the EC (17 submissions are required to obtain this); (6) Construction work permit 
(authorisation to construct), by the EC (six submissions are required to obtain this); (7) Operational 
licence (authorisation to operate), by the EC (six submissions are required for this); (8) Wholesale 
electricity supply licence to generate electricity from renewable energy source, by the EC; (9) Relevant 
approvals from governmental agencies, such as Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GIPC), Ministry 
of Power and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; (10) PPA with off-taker; and (11) Electrical 
connection agreement with GRIDCo.
40 Interview with Biomass representative, EC, 2015.
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financial regulator has been split into two institutions: the PURC and the Energy 
Commission. This has created contradictions in procuring new power, as one 
agency is responsible for providing licences to new generation plants while the 
other is responsible for approving the tariffs in the PPA. This implies that one 
institution could be providing market access while the other blocks it. 
We now look at the contracting stage. As with permitting, there are problems with 
institutional design. PPAs are in theory the competence of distribution utilities ECG 
or Northern Electricity Distribution Company (NEDCO), but the Ministry of Energy, 
VRA and ECG have all separately signed or undertaken commitments to enter 
into PPAs with private generators, each of them following different procedures. 
Other contractual risks include the solvency of the off-taker, currency devaluation, 
inflation and the short period of price guarantees by FiT. 
Pricing has been previously discussed in the ‘Revenues’ subsection, but it is 
worth highlighting here the political interference in price setting and the tensions 
to keep prices low as a regulatory risk. Further regulatory uncertainty comes from 
ambiguous support to FiT. Policymakers perceive FiT as an expensive instrument 
and there is a will to replace them with competitive bids, following the successful 
experience of South Africa.41 Still, no clear regulation has been approved that 
provides transparent guidelines and the government has not announced its 
intentions publicly.42
An additional regulatory constraint comes from the uncertain roles of private and 
public actors. The national generation utility controls 73 per cent of generation 
capacity and can use its existing power to influence the negotiating process for 
new generation capacity to the detriment of private investors. The government has 
openly invited private sector participation as a way out of the energy crisis and 
as of December 2015 there were three IPPs in the country. However, in practice 
the national utility is reluctant to accept an increasing role of the private sector in 
the provision of infrastructure services, as it would diminish control and patronage 
(Malgas and Eberhard 2011). Privatisation of utilities does not have popular 
domestic support either.43 
Regulatory risks therefore come out as an important constraint to investment in 
renewable energy, in all its dimensions: planning, procurement, contracting and market 
access. The next subsection considers the issue of the off-taker, which is crucial to 
understanding how the Ghanaian power system functions – and sometimes does not. 
Off-taker risks
We focus our analysis on the main off-taker in the Ghanaian electricity system, 
the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG). There is a second distribution company, 
NEDCO, which is part of VRA and is the sole distributor in the north. The regions 
covered by ECG represent approximately 36 per cent of the territory surface but 
72 per cent of total demand in Ghana (ECG 2013a). 
41 Interviews with representatives of EC and GCP, 2015.
42 Interviews with the Energy Commission and GCP, 2015.
43 Interview with CEPA, 2015.
IDS RESEARCH REPORT 83
48
In 2016, as we prepared this report, ECG’s last published financial statements 
were for 2013. Although they contained a favourable opinion by the auditors, the 
inability to publish up-to-date statements is a leading indicator of difficulties. This is 
supported by the fact that the ECG has carried an operating loss for the last three 
years, and is currently unable to pay suppliers in time due to insufficient cash flow, 
or to pay down its debt liabilities. 
Current liabilities are significantly higher than current assets and the amount 
of cash and cash equivalents is very low compared to accounts payable and 
short-term borrowing. ECG has 45 per cent short-term debt as compared to equity 
and long-term debt, suggesting very high finance costs. 
System losses are such that almost a quarter of the power purchased from 
generators is not billed, with losses equally attributed to technical and commercial 
reasons. The ratio of revenue collection to sales is 90 per cent, which shows that 
some of the power that is billed is not paid for by consumers. Of the total amount 
of trade receivables, 49 per cent are not overdue and 13 per cent are overdue 
by more than a year. All these indicators are included in Table B8 as part of 
Appendix B and compared to those of the Kenyan off-taker.
As a result of these imbalances, ECG is unable to cover its costs and finance 
critical investment projects (ECG 2013a). The main causes can be summarised as 
follows:
 ● Low tariffs set below cost recovery for distribution and retailing.
 ● Macroeconomic imbalances. ECG must pay IPPs in foreign currency, as 
their PPAs are dollar denominated but it is not compensated for the severe 
depreciation of the cedi.
 ● Cost increases. Prices of imported materials, tools and spare parts have 
soared as the currency has fallen, as has the costs of finance. Furthermore, 
the costs of maintaining and operating rural networks are much higher than 
the revenues they yield, but ECG is not compensated for the highest cost.
 ● Regular load shedding damages the company’s network assets, which need to 
be replaced more frequently. 
 ● Poor revenue collection and billing. About 65 per cent of ECGs debt consists 
of arrears accrued from government and public institutions. 
 ● Increase of distributed generation to directly serve some industrial consumers, 
bypassing ECG. As a consequence, ECG has lost some high revenue-yielding 
consumers. Besides, the power they consume is transported through ECG’s 
distribution network, which imposes certain costs for which the company is not 
reimbursed. 
All these make ECG unable to absorb the higher cost of FiT. Even if it signs 
PPAs with potential generators, these do not provide assurance to financiers that 
they will recoup their investments. Through our interviews, off-taker risks were 
repeatedly highlighted and often singled out as the most important constraint to 
investment in electricity generation:
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The biggest challenge that we have is getting a credible off-taker. 
(Executive Director, KITE, 2015)
If the one who buys and sells electricity is not credible, that is the biggest 
obstacle. 
(Deputy Executive Director, ACEP, 2015) 
ECG is bankrupt. They are not reliable. They can sign PPAs but they will not 
fulfil them because they don’t have any money. 
(Managing Director, Upwind, 2015)
The Ghanaian utility is broke, so the question is will it pay? 
(Chief Executive Officer, Ghana Capital Partners, 2015)
There are two main approaches to mitigating off-taker risk. First, guarantees can 
be obtained from the Ghanaian government or international development agencies 
that bills will be paid in case of default by the national utility. In the past, private IPPs 
in Ghana have relied on the provision of guarantees by the Ghanaian government. 
However, the Ministry of Power has declared that it does not want to be involved with 
guarantees to IPPs, due to the financial difficulties that the government is facing. It 
has recommended instead the use of partial risk guarantees such as those provided 
by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank.44
A second approach is to improve the creditworthiness of the off-taker. This would 
require the reduction of technical and commercial losses, the improvement of 
revenue collection and the professionalisation of ECG management. These 
are key aims of the US Power Africa initiative that provides financial support to 
Ghana’s electricity sector jointly with the Millennium Challenge Corporation through 
the Compact II agreement. US support is conditioned to an increased participation 
of the private sector and, specifically to the concession of ECG for private sector 
management (Power Africa 2015). 
To summarise, it seems clear that the performance of the ECG is a major obstacle 
to investment in the power sector in Ghana. While opinions may differ on the 
best way to resolve this issue, there is little prospect of significantly increasing 
investment until it is resolved. 
Resources and technology
While resolving problems with the off-taker is a crucial precondition to investment, 
it is not the only thing that matters. The viability and attractiveness of renewable 
energy projects will also be strongly affected by the underlying potential of 
renewable resources, and the availability and suitability of technology and 
expertise to exploit these resources. 
For resource potential, the Ghana Meteorological Services Agency has collected 
data on solar radiation and sunshine hours for over 50 years. Kumasi’s Kwame 
Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) measures hourly global 
and diffuse irradiance and has also collected wind speed and biomass resources 
data. Hydropower potential has been investigated for many years in Ghana and 
44 Interviews with Executive Director, KITE and Head of Strategic Planning, EC.
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many potential mini-hydro sites have been identified (IRENA 2015b). We consider 
that there is enough information about the quality of renewable energy resources 
in Ghana and therefore uncertainty is not a significant constraint to investment.
In contrast, there is institutional inexperience, technological immaturity and a lack 
of skilled managerial and technical manpower to oversee and maintain renewable 
energy projects and to manage distribution companies (Gyamfi et al. 2015; Fritsch 
and Poudineh 2016). There is very little experience with renewable energy in 
Ghana apart from hydro, and the country’s higher education rates are well below 
the average for LMI countries. Industrial competitiveness is also very low for the 
country’s income level. 
For grid capacity, GRIDCo’s latest annual report declares that the transmission 
network has just enough capacity to transmit electricity generated from the plants 
to the load centres, but it is unable to withstand contingencies (GRIDCo 2014). 
However, other authors understand that the Ghanaian grid code is not yet ready to 
incorporate intermittent generation (IRENA 2015b). 
Even if there is a lack of capabilities in the country, technology risks do not worry 
our interviewees as a stumbling block in the development of the renewable energy 
sector. Besides, the lack of capabilities does not differ from that of other countries 
without significant experience in the implementation of renewable energy projects. 
We now follow our analysis by looking at macroeconomic risks. 
Macroeconomic risk
As has been mentioned at various points, Ghana faces major macroeconomic 
challenges, including a sharp currency depreciation, high inflation and interest rates 
and large current account and fiscal deficits. The Ghanaian cedi lost 65 per cent 
of its value against the US dollar between 2011 and 2015 and 18 per cent during 
just 2015. The country faces persistently high inflation, which was 18.5 per cent by 
February 2016.45 Ghana’s increasingly unsustainable fiscal and current account 
imbalances required a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2015. 
While Ghana’s fiscal position improved in 2015, the high level of its budget deficit 
and debt still is likely to require further fiscal consolidation (World Bank 2016a).
These issues affect the sustainability of project revenues, the government’s 
capacity to provide guarantees or to sustain subsidised electricity tariffs, and 
hence the creditworthiness of the off-taker. Macroeconomic risks are therefore of 
fundamental importance to international investors. Currency volatility is not unique 
to the country, but has been worse in Ghana than in many comparable countries. 
The same is true for its persistently high inflation. International investors will look 
very carefully at these issues, knowing that they can profoundly affect the core 
economic viability of large-scale infrastructure projects. 
45 Inflation data taken from the Bank of Ghana website, www.bog.gov.gh/ (accessed 28 February 2016).
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Social and reputational risk
As well as the financial risk created by macroeconomic problems, investors may 
also be concerned about social and reputational risk. The development of liquid 
biofuels, for example, has raised social concerns in Ghana, with several reported 
cases of ‘land grab’ (ActionAid 2012).46 In general, technologies requiring large 
areas of land such as solar PV and hydropower have greater potential to create 
conflicts with land users. This is exacerbated by the process for obtaining land 
in Ghana not being transparent enough, with many properties not holding valid 
title documents. Somewhat worryingly, we were unable to find clear guidelines 
on consultation processes required with local communities to develop renewable 
energy projects. 
Despite these issues, Ghana’s human and labour rights record is generally better 
than in other countries in the region. Ghana scores 11 out of a maximum value 
of 14 in the empowerment rights index, for example, which looks at government 
respect for seven rights: foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly and association, workers’ rights, electoral self-
determination and freedom of religion (CIRI Human Rights Dataset 2016).
Although there are precedents of land grabs in biofuel projects, and uncertainty 
with regard to land ownership, the issue of social discontent did not come up in 
any of our interviews with stakeholders. We did not find cases of discontent with 
planned renewable electricity generation projects in the press, either. For this 
reason, we will not consider social opposition among our reduced number of 
constraints to be analysed further. 
Governance risk
Finally, we look at governance as another potential source of risk. Although 
corruption in Ghana is an issue, it appears to be lower than in many SSA and 
LMI countries according to some indicators such as the CPIA (Country Policy and 
Institution Assessment) transparency, accountability and corruption in the public 
sector index, or the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI). 
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys, however, show that as much as 35 per cent 
of companies declare to be expected to give gifts to secure a government contract 
or to obtain a construction permit (World Bank 2013b). This compares to 32 per 
cent to secure a government contract in the SSA region, or 29.5 per cent to obtain 
a construction permit. Corruption at this level is particularly relevant in Ghana 
given the large number of permits and clearances required to be able to develop a 
renewable energy project, as previously described.
Security is better than in the average LMI and SSA country. In 2011, Ghana had 
1.7 intentional homicides per 100,000 people as compared to 5.9 in LMI countries 
and 14.4 in SSA one year later (data for 2011 not available for country groupings). 
46 Land grabbing is the contentious issue of large-scale land acquisitions in developing countries by 
domestic and transnational companies, governments, and individuals, for the purpose of industrial food 
or biofuels production.
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Having reviewed the relative importance of different risks in Ghana, the combined 
evidence – from the indicators in the decision tree and stakeholder interviews – 
suggests that the following are the most important: 
 ● Low returns as compared to alternatives
 ● High financing costs
 ● Low prices
 ● Low capacity factors
 ● Regulatory risk
 ● Off-taker risk
 ● Macroeconomic risk
 ● Corruption.
The following section turns to the other set of potential investment constraints – 
those caused by a lack of available finance. 
4.2 Is appropriate finance available?
According to surveys, access to finance is considered a major obstacle to growth 
by 62 per cent of enterprises in Ghana, compared to 37 per cent in the SSA region 
(World Bank 2013b). The results of a previous Growth Diagnostics exercise for 
Ghana concluded that credit is a binding constraint for private investment, noting 
that credit to the private sector is low compared with other countries, short term in 
nature and costly (United States Government and Government of Ghana 2011). 
Our analysis of the cost of renewables has also shown that the LCOE of renewable 
energy projects is driven up by high financing costs and returns on investment 
are low due to the high cost of debt (Pueyo et al. 2016). At face value, it therefore 
appears that finance is an important constraint to investment in renewable energy 
projects which require large upfront investment. In this section we dig deeper to 
analyse the reasons behind poor access to finance for renewables in Ghana.
Supply of savings
We first look at the supply of savings in Ghana, both national and international. High 
domestic interest rates in Ghana show a high willingness to remunerate savings, 
which may indicate a shortage of underlying finance. Treasury bills have rates higher 
than 22 per cent and the average lending rate was 29 per cent as of September 
2015 (Bank of Ghana 2016). At the same time, gross domestic savings, private 
credit and stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP are significantly lower 
than in the average LMI country. The fact that scarce capital is combined with high 
interest rates suggests access to credit as a significant constraint. Our interviews 
confirm that banks do not have enough capital of the right form for renewable 
projects, which makes it necessary for investors to look for finance abroad.47
47 Interviews with Deputy Director, ACEP, and CEO, GCP, 2015.
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For external finance, Ghana shows better access to FDI than their income and 
regional group peers. Ghana has also been able to tap the global capital markets 
by issuing bonds or attracting foreign investment in its stock market, as shown by 
relatively high figures of portfolio equity investment inflows. Inflows of Overseas 
Development Aid (ODA) are higher in Ghana than for the average SSA country, 
but its graduation from low-income country to LMI country will limit its access to 
concessional finance in the long run. 
While the evidence overall suggests that access to international finance is not 
a major constraint in Ghana, and that Ghana attracts more ODA than might be 
expected, this is less clear for the electricity sector. Here, ODA to Ghana is much 
lower than the average amount going to either low- or middle-income countries. 
The former attract ODA flows to the electricity sector at an average of 0.24 per 
cent of GDP, while the average figure for the latter is 0.21 per cent. ODA flows to 
the electricity sector in Ghana, however, are 0.19 per cent. The fact that Ghana is 
not short of aid finance in general, but this does not flow to the power sector, points 
at constraints to the sector attractiveness for donors, not to the availability of donor 
finance. 
Intermediation
In addition to the low supply of domestic savings, it could be the case that this is 
poorly allocated. A wide spread between bank deposit and lending rates in Ghana 
in fact suggests that there are intermediation problems in the financial sector.48 The 
spread is much wider than in Ghana’s regional and income groupings, as shown in 
the tables of indicators in Appendix B.
One possible explanation is a lack of competition in the sector. Bank concentration, 
however, is lower in Ghana than in SSA and is in line with the average for 
comparable LMI countries. The Boone indicator is also lower than for the other 
groups, suggesting a higher level of competition in Ghana. Concentration and 
competition do not seem to be a significant problem in Ghana in comparison with 
other countries in its region or income group. 
Ghana’s banking sector is more risky, however, as measured by non-performing 
loans and conmensurate large return expectations compared to its peers. Banks 
have a relatively small amount of capital and cannot provide large long-term loans, 
as their businesses would be jeopardised in the event of a default. Local banks, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, prefer to focus on lucrative short-term loans with very high 
interest rates of up to 35 per cent.49
The main constraints identified at the finance side of the decision tree are 
therefore: the insufficient supply of domestic savings and poor intermediation 
due to a risky lending environment, and the availability of lucrative short-term 
investment alternatives. 
48 The average three-month time bank deposit rate in Ghana was 13 per cent and the average lending 
rate was 28.98 per cent at the end of September 2015 (www.bog.gov.gh/, accessed 28 February 2016).
49 Interviews wtih Deputy Executive Director of ACEP, 2016 and Executive Director of KITE, 2015.
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4.3 Narrowing down constraints and positing a syndrome
To summarise, we have examined potential investment constraints in Ghana 
from the perspective of the supply of finance and the relative attractiveness of 
particular projects. A number of possible constraints have been ruled out, but others 
have emerged as possible ‘binding’ constraints. These are highlighted in bold in 
Figure 4.1. As we can see, these arise in both branches of the decision tree: project 
attractiveness and access to finance. In the analysis, we include financing costs, 
which appear in the ‘project attractiveness’ side of our decision tree, as part of the 
financing constraints. This delivers a total of seven potentially binding constraints.
The next step of the analysis looks for further evidence to prioritise constraints 
through a number of tests adapted from the Growth Diagnostics framework. 
Specifically, we look at shadow prices, and at evidence that actors are trying to 
bypass identified constraints and that those actors less exposed to a particular 
constraint are more likely to survive and thrive. Shadow prices are only relevant 
for constraints that relate to the scarcity of a particular resource, such as domestic 
savings or good governance in the case of Ghana. 
The evidence of the binding character of domestic savings is clear. As we have 
seen, Ghanaian banks and the government are willing to remunerate savings 
with high interest rates for deposits and bonds. We have also observed high 
foreign debt and a high current account deficit, much higher than in the rest of 
SSA or other LMI countries. This signals that Ghana has used up its access to 
foreign savings to the limit, given the lack of domestic savings. In the particular 
case of investments in electricity generation projects, all IPPs are fully financed 
internationally (except for the first IPP in the country, Tadoradi 2, which was 
structured as a joint venture with 10 per cent participation of the national utility 
VRA). There is a significant influx of Chinese capital in Ghanaian IPPs, with more 
than 30 per cent of IPP capacity relying on Chinese investment. There is also 
a significant share of United States’ equity investors. Publicly owned plants are 
financed internationally, with concessional loans from international development 
agencies as well as from commercial lenders (VRA 2014). Another symptom of the 
Figure 4.1 Ghana’s constraints decision tree
Source: Authors’ own.
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constraining character of insufficient savings is that power plants with low upfront 
costs but high operational costs, hence less vulnerable to high financing costs, are 
more likely to thrive. Such is the case of the recently commissioned oil and gas 
power barges, which are extremely expensive to run but cheap to build. 
There is also clear evidence of problems of intermediation, from the wide spread 
between deposits and lending rates, the evidence of a more risky environment 
(with more defaults than in similar countries), and a tendency to provide short-term 
finance with high returns expectations. 
Macroeconomic and off-taker risks are partly related. They reflect the 
government’s accumulation of obligations that it cannot meet, either increasing 
foreign debt to unsustainable levels, or selling electricity for less than it costs. 
External imbalances have translated into rapid currency depreciation that damages 
the returns for investors. On the other side, imbalances at the level of the off-taker 
put electricity generators on the brink of bankruptcy. For example, the national 
generation utility VRA is currently struggling to raise finance for new projects due 
to its poor financial health, caused by low tariffs and the poor payment record of 
ECG (VRA 2014).
Constraints related to the creditworthiness of the off-taker have been addressed in 
the past through mitigation instruments such as sovereign guarantees and PRG, 
but these are getting harder to obtain, as we have seen. Another way of bypassing 
off-taker risks is selling directly to consumers. This has long been allowed in theory 
but until recently all domestic generation was sold to the national distribution 
companies and surpluses were exported (Kapika and Eberhard 2013). VRA has 
prevented direct contracts between generators and consumers in the past (Malgas 
and Eberhard 2011).50 However, distributed (or embedded) generation is rising in 
Ghana (EC 2016a). For example, a new private 30MW dual fuel coal power plant 
started direct power supply to the mining industry in 2016 and a 5MW LPG-fired 
(liquefied petroleum gas) power plant supplies electricity to industrial customers 
in Tema. The plant uses diesel-generating sets and is wholly owned by Ghanaian 
investors. There are also several biomass power plants that do not feed their 
power to the grid (IRENA 2015b) and the use of generators for self-supply is 
pervasive in Ghana. Fifty-two per cent of firms own a generator, a much larger 
percentage than in the rest of SSA (World Bank 2013b). 
The accumulation of unsustainable obligations is also related to corruption and 
patronage, which were highlighted as another potentially binding constraint. 
Low prices also reflect the use of public services to win political support. There is 
an understanding of electricity as public service and a desire to provide universal 
access to electricity, even for those that cannot afford it. Ghana’s electrification 
model based on geographically equitable coverage has in fact achieved higher 
access rates than any other country in SSA except South Africa (IEG 2008).
A clear symptom of regulatory problems is, as we have seen, the large number 
of projects awaiting permits to get built and start operations. As evidenced by the 
solar PV plant BXC, even when finance is readily available, and construction is 
speedy, it is extremely difficult for renewable energy projects to start commercial 
50 www.gasandoil.com/news/1998/03/cna81072 
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operations. At the moment of finalising this research, the plant was still carrying 
tests to obtain an operational licence, even though it has been built since October 
2015.51 The Energy Commission has indicated that one of the major problems that 
limit the operation of the plant is that ‘it cannot inject power to the grid when there 
is a problem of curtailment’ (EC 2016a: 4).
The government is reluctant to fast-track renewables. However, it is much more 
ready to take risks when it comes to fossil fuel plants. Karpowership and Ameri oil 
and gas emergency plants got their required licences and started operation in record 
time as the government facilitated their deployment on a fast-track basis. Besides, 
the Ameri gas power plant benefits from a take-or-pay clause in its PPA, which 
imposes a heavy cost for the Ghanaian economy when gas supply is interrupted.
Our interviewees point at regulators’ lack of expertise in renewables and 
misinformation with regard to their cost. One of our informants explained that ‘the 
Minister’s approach to energy security is fossil fuels. He thinks we should buy coal 
and bring oil and gas power barges, but does not realise that imported fossil fuels 
will drive up costs and insecurity’.52 Even though gas will be a key part of Ghana’s 
power sector improvement, at the moment gas supply shortages are very costly 
as the government is tied to payments to generators through take-or-pay clauses 
even when they cannot produce. Oil-based generators have so far enjoyed low oil 
prices, but the government has signed ten-year contracts with them, and the price 
of oil is likely to rise over that period. 
We are unable to single out a single constraint as being the most binding, because 
all the identified constraints are highly interrelated and show symptoms to back 
them up. We find, however, many indications of a syndrome that comprehends 
the malaise of renewable electricity in Ghana. We call this the syndrome of 
the over-borrowing state. The Ghanaian government has assumed a number 
of commitments that it is unable to meet with its own resources: for example 
affordable electricity tariffs, high rates of rural electrification and cheap fossil fuels. 
The Ghanaian state is also prone to patronage, increasing civil servant salaries or 
providing benefits to gain political support. These tendencies were exacerbated 
by the fall of commodity prices in recent years, which forced the government to 
borrow heavily from international markets and eventually led to a bailout by the 
IMF in 2015. To sustain its high fiscal deficit, the government offers higher bond 
rates than the private returns to investment in the real economy, hence crowding 
out private financial markets. The new government has made promises that might 
put the power sector under further stress, such as an aggressive industrialisation 
and universal electrification. 
51 http://bxcghana.com/index.php/building-of-40-megawatts-solar-energy-plant-at-mangoadze/ (accessed 
6 October 2016).
52 Interview ACEP, 2015.
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5 Green Investment Diagnostics – 
Kenya
Section 2 showed that Kenya has been able to attract investment in renewable 
energy, mainly large-scale geothermal and wind. However, access levels remain 
small and there are threats to the stability of the system as a result of technological 
choices made for capacity expansion. Our diagnosis will look at both the factors 
behind success to attract investment in some technologies, and the remaining 
constraints that prevent investment in a more flexible and inclusive electricity system.
5.1 Are renewable energy projects attractive?
Our previous research on costs and returns of utility-scale hydro, solar PV, wind 
and geothermal power in Kenya showed very healthy returns on equity (ROE) for 
geothermal power at a FiT of 8.8 USD cents per kWh (Pueyo et al. 2016). The 
ROE for geothermal could reach 30 per cent at the low costs of debt (3 per cent) 
enjoyed by publicly owned plants and 17 per cent at higher debt interest rates 
around 8 per cent (ibid.). However, none of the existing geothermal plants have 
used FiT and hence we cannot assume that they benefit from such prices. On the 
other hand, private investors would be unlikely to access finance as cheap as the 
Kenyan public geothermal plants did. Therefore actual returns of plants in the past 
may have been lower than our estimates, but very high returns are feasible under 
FiT prices and low cost of debt.
Wind power plants can also deliver high returns of between 14 and 20 per cent 
depending on access to concessional finance, at a FiT of 11 USD cents per kWh. 
Solar PV and hydropower offer modest returns of between 5 and 9 per cent 
depending on the cost of finance, at FiT of 12 USD cents per kWh for solar PV and 
8.2 USD cents per kWh for hydro (ibid.). 
Expected returns for wind and geothermal power are very competitive with other 
investment alternatives in Kenya. For example, treasury bills pay nominal rates 
of 8.8 per cent as per December 2015 and equity investors require returns of 
between 16 and 20 per cent (ibid.). Solar PV would require higher FiT, close to 
18 USD cents per kWh to deliver competitive returns. Low FiT for hydropower also 
means that only the projects with the best resource and lower investment cost are 
financially viable. 
Privately owned mini-grids would typically require a 20 per cent return on equity 
investment in Kenya (Pueyo 2015; Carbon Africa et al. 2015). A study of the 
potential of mini-grids in Kenya indicates that tariffs required for cost recovery 
given this level of required return would only be affordable to around 5–10 per cent 
of the rural population (Carbon Africa et al. 2015). Although the government has 
approved a FiT for off-grid solar PV, at 20 USD cents per kWh it is insufficient to 
cover the costs of private off-grid generators (Ministry of Energy 2012). 
Lower return on equity requirements could therefore increase the size of the 
viable market for mini-grids. This could be achieved through, for example, capital 
subsidies, community ownership, or further public participation through the Rural 
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Electrification Authority (REA) or Kenya Power. On the other hand, subsidised 
tariffs could improve affordability for consumers but risk creating long-term financial 
dependence. 
Returns of geothermal and wind are therefore considered very attractive when 
compared to alternatives in the global investment market, as presented in 
Table 4.1 included as part of Section 4.1 about project attractiveness in Ghana. 
However, returns of utility-scale solar PV are still not high enough as compared to 
potential alternatives. 
Costs
Our previous work on cost and returns of renewables shows that grid-connected 
geothermal and wind power offer least cost, affordable electricity in Kenya. Using 
a social discount rate of 10 per cent, we estimated a LCOE of geothermal power 
of 7.3 USD cents per kWh. Geothermal plants in Kenya have actually been able 
to obtain much cheaper finance from development banks and donors, enabling 
a LCOE of 5 USD per kWh or lower. The LCOE of a generic wind power plant 
using a 10 per cent discount rate is 10.3 USD cents per kWh. However, sites with 
exceptional wind resources, such as that of Lake Turkana Wind Power Project 
(LTWP), can reach a LCOE of 7.5 USD cents per kWh. In our previous study of 
costs, we estimated a LCOE of 14.8 USD cents per kWh for solar PV using a 
10 per cent discount rate, but the latest generation expansion plan suggest a lower 
cost of 12.54 USD cents per kWh (Lahmeyer International 2016). 
Figure 5.1 shows the LCOE for different generation alternatives in Kenya using a 
10 per cent social discount rate, as presented in the most recent generation expansion 
plan. Wind, bagasse cogeneration and geothermal power are clearly competitive with 
 Gasoil HFO MSD Coal CCGT Nuclear Hydro Solar PV Wind Bagasse Geot Ethiopia  
           HVDC
Figure 5.1 Levelised cost of energy at 10 per cent discount rate for several generation 
candidates in Kenya
Note: LCOE for coal, hydro and wind estimated as an average of different plants.  
Source: Author’s own with data from Lahmeyer International (2016).
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fossil fuel alternatives.53 Also, because renewables are able to attract least cost finance 
from development banks, the competitiveness gap may be wider than depicted. 
Even if project costs are competitive, however, system costs could be an important 
constraint for the further penetration of renewables in Kenya. The fast introduction 
of a large share of wind power in a single location, as will happen with the 300MW 
LTWP, could destabilise the system as it will not allow the grid manager to learn 
gradually how to integrate intermittent renewables. Flexibility could be provided 
by hydropower, pumped storage, natural gas and diesel engines, or by flexible 
interconnections with neighbouring countries. Planned interconnections with 
Ethiopia do not introduce much flexibility, however, because they commit Kenya to 
purchase a fixed amount of electricity (Lahmeyer International 2016). 
With regard to transmission costs, the standardised PPAs published by the Energy 
Regulatory Commission (ERC) require the seller of electricity to cover the ‘shallow’ 
connection cost (the required infrastructure as far as the existing network). Because 
the national transmission and distribution network does not cover a large share of 
the country, costs to the existing network could be very high in many locations. New 
transmission lines are covered by KETRACO, but there can be considerable delays 
in their implementation, which could add to the costs of renewable energy projects. 
Appendix B includes further indicators of system costs in Kenya. 
Unsubsidised mini-grids are not affordable for most of the population. Their cost 
is significantly higher than that of electricity from the grid, at a LCOE of between 
65 and 80 USD cents per kWh. This assumes a 6 per cent cost for concessional 
debt and a 20 per cent cost of equity (Carbon Africa et al. 2015).
In summary, electricity from renewable energy sources is cost competitive in 
Kenya. However, the variable generation from wind and solar resources could 
significantly increase system costs, if it is not properly planned. 
Revenues
We look at four elements of revenues for a renewable energy project: demand, 
price, quality of the renewable energy resource and risk of curtailment.
Healthy returns are only possible when there is enough demand for the electricity 
generated. This is particularly problematic for intermittent generation like wind, 
which sometimes produces power when demand is low, such as in the middle 
of the night. Intermittent generators thus need to be able to sell the electricity 
they produce to be financially viable. To ensure this, financiers often require a 
take-or-pay clause in wind power PPAs that commits the off-taker to purchase 
all their power or otherwise pay for it. The risk of curtailment is an important 
constraint for intermittent generators but take-or-pay clauses to mitigate it 
can be very onerous for the off-taker. Such concerns drove the World Bank to 
withdraw guarantees it had agreed to provide to the large 300MW LTWP currently 
under construction in North Kenya. The Bank deemed that low demand, lack 
of experience of the grid operator to manage such a large share of wind power 
53 Bagasse is dry pulpy residue left after the extraction of juice from sugar cane. Bagasse is utilised as a 
biofuel for cogeneration of heat and power and for the manufacture of pulp and building materials.
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concentrated in a single site, and constraints in transmission capacity could expose 
Kenya Power to unacceptably large financial risks (Business Daily Africa 2012). 
Several indicators show that demand in Kenya is growing more rapidly than in the 
rest of Sub-Saharan African countries, and LMI countries as a whole. However, 
growth is still below the very optimistic 10 per cent aspiration of Kenya’s Vision 
2030 strategy which guided much of the country’s generation expansion plans. 
This high level of growth is considered unrealistic in the most recent power 
generation and transmission plan (Lahmeyer International 2016). 
More broadly, economic growth in Kenya is very volatile, which makes it harder 
to predict energy demand. A high poverty incidence and low income per capita 
indicate a low ability to pay for electricity at the household level. External demand 
is small at the moment. Although there are interconnections with Uganda and 
Tanzania via 132Kv transmission lines, international trade is minimal. 
We consider that there is a risk of curtailment of intermittent renewable energy 
in Kenya at the moment due to low demand, low transmission capacity and low 
external trade. However, there are plans to increase interconnections with other 
countries as well as transmission capacity, which may mitigate this risk.54 
The small size of Kenya’s demand was highlighted by our interviewees as a 
particular problem for intermittent generators.55 Poverty rates in Kenya are higher 
than in SSA as a whole and demand in rural areas is particularly small, which 
makes it financially unviable to extend the grid.
Productive uses are very small, and most people do not have energy-intensive 
appliances in their homes. Electricity is primarily used to charge mobile 
phones, which does not allow the recovery of generation, transmission and 
distribution costs. 
(Director of Quality and Environment, EPC contractor)
For off-grid alternatives, some approaches to reduce the risk of low demand are 
modular mini-grids, which can grow as demand builds up; hybrid mini-grids that can 
use diesel generation to provide power during peak hours or demand management 
approaches which distribute the load over the day to avoid overcapacity.
Electricity tariffs in Kenya are set by the ERC. Kenya has made a significant effort to 
design cost-reflective tariffs that enable all the operators in the electricity system to 
maintain their financial integrity, attract capital, operate efficiently and fully compensate 
investors for the risks assumed (ERC 2010). This has met some opposition from large 
industrial consumers, which represent a small share of connections but more than 
70 per cent of the total consumption. These actors argue that Kenya’s electricity tariffs 
are significantly higher than in other regions, damaging their competitiveness, and 
exert strong pressure on the government to reduce tariffs to a more competitive level.
Tariffs comprise of a fixed charge, a demand charge and an energy charge. The 
fixed charge is set to recover the customer-related costs of metering, meter reading, 
54 For example, the planned use of the interconnection with Uganda to transmit power to Rwanda would 
increase external demand (Lahmeyer International 2016).
55 Interview with Project Manager, Aldwych International and Director of Research and Policy, KBA, 2015.
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inspection, maintenance billing and customer accounting. These charges remain 
constant but vary with the customer category, being higher for larger consumers. 
The demand charge recovers the costs associated with the transmission and 
distribution network. It is derived directly from the long run marginal cost related to 
the transmission and distribution network. Domestic consumers and the smallest 
commercial consumers are not required to pay a demand charge and hence 
transmission and distribution costs are fully covered by the industry. They remain 
constant but are smaller for larger consumers. The energy charge per kWh is set on 
the long run marginal cost of electricity and is progressive for residential consumers, 
with the lowest consumers paying less than wealthier, more intensive consumers. 
Commercial and industrial tariffs work the other way, with the largest consumers 
paying less per kWh. Energy charges for commercial consumers are lower than 
those for residential consumers, but commercial consumers are subject to higher 
monthly fixed charges and demand charges.
A key feature of Kenya’s tariff schedule is the automatic monthly pass-through of 
generation fuel costs and exchange rate fluctuations through fuel cost charges and 
the foreign exchange rates fluctuation adjustment, as well as inflation adjustments 
every six months. Additionally, consumers pay a water levy for the use of hydro 
resources at 5 UDSD cents per kWh, an Energy Regulatory Commission levy at 
3 cents per kWh, Rural Electrification Programme Levy at 5 per cent of the base 
rate and VAT at 16 per cent on everything except the water levy, the regulator and 
rural electrification levies and inflation adjustment (ERC 2013). 
Kenya has approved FiT to promote investment in renewable energy generation. 
The policy was first published in 2008, and has since been revised twice to include 
additional technologies, and change capacity limits and tariffs when they were not 
deemed attractive enough for investors. The last revision was in December 2012. 
The main elements of the FiT are guaranteed tariffs, a connection obligation for the 
transmission company and a purchase obligation for the off-taker. The FiT includes 
an allowance for interconnection costs, which must be borne by the developer. 
The off-taker must guarantee priority purchase, transmission and distribution for 
small renewable energy projects and comply with the terms of a negotiated PPA for 
large-scale renewable energy projects. The off-taker can pass through the costs of 
the FiT to the final consumer (Ministry of Energy 2012).
FiT are denominated in USD or other selected foreign currency and guaranteed for 
20 years. They have a fixed value and an indexed component related to OandM costs, 
which are the only costs that will vary during the 20-year guaranteed period. Because 
retail tariffs are set at cost recovery levels, they are not much lower than the FiT. 
Only renewable energy projects below a maximum cumulative capacity can 
benefit from FiT, whereas larger generators must seek direct negotiation with the 
off-taker Kenya Power. In the short term, it is expected that Kenya will approve a 
competitive bidding scheme for these larger generators.56 Capacity limits for FiT 
are 50MW for wind, 40MW for solar PV and biomass, 70MW for geothermal and 
20MW for hydro. Larger projects need to negotiate their PPAs and related tariffs 
56 Discussions with Mott MacDonald, technical advisor to the Kenyan government, December 2015.
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directly with Kenya Power. Small renewable energy projects, with capacities under 
10MW, benefit from a technology-neutral, standardised PPA and they are approved 
on a first-come, first-served basis. Projects larger than 10MW have to negotiate 
with Kenya Power some of the clauses of the PPA. 
The third element for revenue generation are renewable energy resources. Kenya 
enjoys very rich renewable energy resources, hence renewable energy projects 
benefit from high capacity factors. Certain regions (such as Marsabit, Turkana, 
Ngong and the coastal region) enjoy world class wind resources, with average 
speeds ranging from 8–14m/s, allowing for capacity factors above 40 per cent 
(Kiplagat, Wang and Li 2011). The LTWP, in particular, claims a capacity factor of 
62 per cent in corporate presentations (Aldwych International 2014). Kenya’s solar 
resource is also vast and geothermal resources, located in the volcanic centres 
around the Rift Valley are unique in Africa.
In summary, whereas renewable energy resources are world class and prices are 
about right, a small demand and the risk of curtailment could pose some challenges 
for revenue generation by large-scale renewable energy plants in Kenya.
Having analysed the returns of renewable energy in Kenya, we continue the 
assessment of project attractiveness by looking at the associated risks, starting 
with regulatory risk.
Regulatory risks
Responsibilities for planning, procurement, contracting and permitting of power 
generation capacity in Kenya are generally well defined and efficient. As a result, 
Kenya has been one of the most successful countries in SSA in attracting IPPs 
(Eberhard et al. 2016). The Kenyan energy sector was restructured after 1996 from 
a state monopoly towards unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution 
responsibilities, introduction of IPPs, and private participation in state-owned 
utilities. The energy policy of 2004 created a new independent regulator for the 
energy sector: the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). Its functions include 
planning, at the front-end of the procurement process, and permitting at the 
back-end, as well as tariff setting and oversight, monitoring and enforcement of 
sector regulations (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum 2014). 
Planning processes in Kenya are considered generally good. They are updated 
regularly to respond to changes in decision parameters; are based on solid 
analysis from independent technical advisors; and are linked to procurement 
processes. However, they also have important weaknesses. Until recently, for 
example, demand forecasts were based on unrealistically fast growth expectations 
(Lahmeyer International 2016). Consequently, expansion plans focused on 
large-scale generation infrastructure, including coal, gas and wind. 
Another issue is that plans have failed to address the challenges posed by 
increasing shares of intermittent generation capacity. As a result, there have been 
significant delays in the implementation of several committed projects, particularly 
those developed by the private sector. Only LTWP, among four committed wind 
power plants featured in the 2011 Least Cost Power Development Plan (LCPDP) 
had started construction in 2016, for example. The most recent plan still includes 
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four committed wind power plants for a total of 210MW to be commissioned in 
2017 and 2018, in addition to LTWP. Besides, one large 980MW coal power plant 
would be commissioned between 2020 and 2022. 
Planning for rural electrification is the responsibility of the Rural Electrification 
Authority (REA), established by the Energy Act of 2006. While we could not find a 
rural electrification master plan on the websites of the REA or any other institution, 
Kenya Power contracted an international engineering firm to prepare a Distribution 
Master Plan that forecasts electricity demand for all Kenyan counties and identifies 
the distribution infrastructure required (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2013). 
The Distribution Master Plan acknowledges several limitations. Firstly, information 
about the coverage of the national grid and the implementation of private mini-grids 
is very limited, even for the consultants preparing the plan. The capacity of mini-grids 
is growing in Kenya as more donors and private investors become interested in 
decentralised alternatives to electrification, but there is not an integrated on- and 
off-grid approach to planning. This creates uncertainty, not only for the planners but 
also for private sector developers looking to invest in off-grid solutions. 
Another weakness of current planning approaches is that demand forecasts 
are too top-down, based on aspirations rather than objective expectations (for 
example, for GDP growth, population growth rates, urbanisation, electrification 
targets and consumption). There appears to be significant scope to improve 
demand forecasts through bottom-up approaches that integrate network planning 
with demographic data (for example, on income level and location) using 
geographic information systems (Chattopadhyay et al. 2014). 
Finally, there is no learning from previous electrification programmes, with regard 
to connection rates and consumption growth after connection. 
A representative from an international EPC contractor with operations in the 
Kenyan electricity sector offered the following perspective about the weaknesses 
of the planning processes:
Planning is the single most important aspect that needs to be addressed to 
improve the prospects of RE investment in Kenya. There has to be a clearer 
perspective from the government. If the priority is industrialisation, then they 
have to build large-scale infrastructure. If the priority is to extend access, then 
they need to combine off-grid and on-grid infrastructure. A good distribution 
network is what determines the prosperity of a country. Having all the 
generation infrastructure connected provides reliability and supports growth. 
(Director of Quality and Environment, International EPC contractor) 
We now describe issues related to procurement. Responsibilities for procurement 
are not explicitly defined, but typically when Kengen is unable to finance the 
new investments required in the expansion plan, the private sector is invited 
to participate. Kenya Power, the distribution utility and grid operator, is usually 
in charge of opening competitive bidding processes to select the best private 
supplier. Kenya has a strong track record of procurement through international 
competitive bids run by Kenya Power. Up to seven IPPs have been procured this 
way since 1996. As a consequence, Kenya Power has accumulated considerable 
capabilities and bidders have been reassured of a trustworthy system, which 
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reflects in an increase in interested bidders in the most recent rounds. However, 
there have been a few cases when procurement has been handled by the 
government directly or when Kengen, the national power generation utility, has 
been appointed by the government to procure new plants. There have also been 
some instances where the government has considered unsolicited bids, most 
notably in the case of the large LTWP (Eberhard et al. 2016).
Generators feeding to the grid must sell their electricity to Kenya Power, which is 
therefore in charge of contracting through PPAs. PPAs stipulate the price, technical 
specifications, risk allocation, rights and obligations of the parties. The ERC needs 
to approve the PPA before it can be signed by the parties, taking into account the 
fairness of consumer and capacity prices and the amount of energy provided. IPPs 
must obtain a number of permits and clearances from different institutions before 
their PPAs are approved and they are granted an Electricity Generation licence. 
The ERC has developed a renewable energy portal to guide investors through 
permitting processes.57 The portal clearly shows the number and sequence of 
permits required to build and operate a renewable generation plant, the institutions 
responsible for each permit, the amount of time each clearance should take and 
the application fee, when applicable. All developers of plants connected to the grid 
would need to obtain seven permits and approvals.58 Off-grid plants larger than 
1MW need the same number of permits, but if they are not benefiting from a FiT 
scheme they do not need to agree a PPA with Kenya Power. 
The Kenyan government introduced a FiT scheme in 2008 to promote private investment 
in renewable energy, as described in the ‘Revenues’ subsection previously. The scheme 
has, however, not been very successful in leading to operational projects. There is a 
long pipeline of unsolicited projects under the FiT scheme undergoing PPA negotiations, 
including more than 500MW of solar PV power, distributed amongst 15 projects and 
550MW of wind power distributed amongst 13 projects (Lahmeyer International 2016). 
Several projects have approved PPAs through the FiT scheme, including three large 
wind farms, one biomass cogeneration plant and 21 small hydropower projects for an 
overall capacity of 89MW. At the time of writing, only the biomass plant was operational 
and using a FiT. The large LTWP is outside the capacity cap set for projects using FiT 
and was initiated as an unsolicited bid negotiated directly with the Government of Kenya. 
The private geothermal plant Orpower was initially awarded through a competitive 
bid and subsequently extended in direct negotiations with Kenya Power (Eberhard 
et al. 2016). The fact that the FiT policy has hardly been used raises questions about 
its usefulness, especially considering the good track record that Kenya already had 
57 www.renewableenergy.go.ke/.
58 The following permits are required in Kenya to operate a renewable energy plant: (1) Approval of 
an Expression of Interest and Detailed Feasibility Study – granted by the Ministry of Energy and 
Petroleum; (2) Environmental Impact Assessment – granted by the National Environment Management 
Authority; (3) Approval of Change of User – granted by the County Authority to control land use and 
development; (4) Power Purchase Agreement – agreed with Kenya Power. The PPA can be either 
capacity based or FiT based. Standardised PPAs are available on the ERC website; (5) Approval 
of PPA – provided by ERC, to guarantee fairness of prices and the quantity of electricity provided; 
(6) Electricity Generation, Distribution and (or) Supply licence – granted by ERC when there is 
compliance with the Energy Act and Electricity Licensing Regulations; and (7) Development permit – 
granted by the county government to ensure safety of buildings and control planning. 
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with competitive bids. The government has therefore manifested a preference for the 
competitive procurement of large renewable energy projects and has contracted an 
international consultancy to design renewable energy auctions.59 
Existing private mini-grids in Kenya are smaller than 1MW, but there is not a clear 
regulatory framework for such small plants outside the national grid. While this 
provides freedom for developers to locate where they want and charge the fees 
they need, it also increases uncertainty (ECA et al. 2014). Private developers of 
mini-grids would benefit from regulation that provides certainty to their business 
model when the grid reaches their site, for example through concessions or private 
delivery models working jointly with the grid (for example, mini-grid developers are 
required to use grid-compatible systems that provide grid stability support or help 
with densification of connections or increasing new connections). 
With regard to market access, even though Kengen dominates the generation 
market, with more than 72 per cent of assets, public and private procurement is 
seen as complementary, not competitive. Private sector players have been more 
successful in developing fossil fuel-based plants and cogeneration, while Kengen 
dominates hydro and geothermal power generation.
In summary, the main regulatory constraints in the Kenyan system come from 
planning processes that have overestimated demand and so far have not 
integrated on- and off-grid generation alternatives; a large number of unsolicited 
renewable energy proposals; and uncertain regulation for private mini-grids. 
Off-taker risks
Kenya Power is the off-taker in Kenya’s electricity system. It owns and operates 
most of the transmission and distribution system in the country and is also in 
charge of retailing. It is partially privatised, but the government holds a majority 
stake. Kenya Power has a good track record in paying private electricity suppliers 
and honouring PPAs. The company has been profitable since 2004, after emerging 
from a period of sustained loss-making. 
The operating income or EBIT has been positive for over a decade and the EBIT 
margin, at 12 per cent in 2015, is at the level of the median observed for electricity 
and gas retailers in OECD countries. There is sufficient liquidity, with current 
assets higher than current liabilities at a 60 per cent ratio, and cash and cash 
deposits accounting for 91 per cent of accounts payable. 
The financial structure is solid with short-term debt representing a small share 
of equity and long-term debt. The company has well-established credit control 
procedures to ensure payment by customers and has installed a large amount of 
prepaid and automatic meters to minimise the risk of non-collection. 
Kenya Power is therefore a creditworthy off-taker that does not pose major 
constraints to investment in the Kenyan electricity sector. However, there is 
concern about how the financial strength of Kenya Power will be affected by the 
overcapacity that could result from recently signed PPAs (Eberhard et al. 2016).
59 Discussions with Mott MacDonald, technical advisor to the Kenyan government, December 2015.
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Resources and technology
Kenya enjoys vast renewable energy resources. There is a potential for  
8,000–12,000MW of geothermal power, or more than four times the current 
capacity of the Kenyan electricity system. Geothermal resources are assessed by 
the state-owned Geothermal Development Corporation (GDC). GDC announced 
in 2015 a new specific master plan for geothermal development, co-funded with 
the Japanese International Development Agency (JICA) that will provide the most 
recent status of geothermal resource potential in Kenya. 
Hydropower potential is assessed in the National Water Resources Management 
Strategy (NWRMS). Even though hydro has been used extensively in Kenya, there 
is still substantial potential, as reflected by current plans to develop a large project 
for over 800MW of capacity. 
High-level wind and solar PV energy resource assessments were carried out in 
2008, with more recent assessments in 2013 also showing a large potential of 
about 4,600MW for wind. More detailed resource assessments are required for 
biomass, as there are no specific surveys of agro residues for energy use. 
The reliability of geothermal and biomass resources could be a constraint for their further 
development, however. GDC, which holds steam mining rights in Kenya, for example, 
has not been able to source as much steam as required, and its perceived technical and 
financial weakness could prevent private investment. Recent geothermal projects at the 
Menengai site, for example, required PRG from the African Development Bank to cover 
the steam supply risk and the risk of payment default by Kenya Power (Eberhard et al. 
2016). Biomass resource supply has also been problematic in the sugar industry.60
With regard to capabilities in the country, statistics show a lower level of tertiary 
education than would be expected for a middle-income country. The Competitive 
Industrial Performance Index is also low, with Kenya ranked 108th among 
140 countries globally and in the ninth position among 25 Sub-Saharan African 
countries. This lack of local skills increases the cost of projects, as they must rely 
on external staff, and may prevent technology transfer.61
A lack of infrastructure (mainly roads and transmission lines) also increases costs and 
risks for more geographically remote projects.62 Transmission and distribution networks 
are weak. The latest power generation and transmission master plan highlights the 
need for considerable expansion, reinforcement and rehabilitation measures to allow 
the stable transport of energy from power plants to load centres (Lahmeyer International 
2016). Besides, the grid code provides limited operational rules for managing variable 
renewable energy and there are no clear rules defining the share of curtailment costs 
and wheeling charges of transmission and distribution networks (World Bank 2014). 
In summary, Kenya faces resource supply risks for geothermal and biomass, a low 
level of local skills and a lack of transmission and distribution infrastructure, which 
can increase project costs or delay construction. 
60 Interview with Andrew Barnett, the Policy Practice.
61 Interview with the Director of QandE, International EPC contractor, 2015.
62 Interview with Project Manager, Aldwych International, 2015.
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Macroeconomic risk
Kenya’s macroeconomic indicators are stable in comparison to other SSA 
countries. Currency devaluation is moderate with a 13 per cent devaluation of 
the KSh against the USD since 2011, and year-on-year inflation of 6.6 per cent in 
December 2015 (Central Bank of Kenya 2015). 
Kenya’s current account balance has been significantly in deficit since 2004, 
however, as a consequence of a fast growth in imports of machinery and transport 
equipment, manufactured goods and oil. Exports are concentrated in a small 
basket of agricultural products, mainly tea, coffee and horticulture. Recent low oil 
prices have allowed the current account deficit to contract from 10.4 per cent of 
GDP in 2014 to 7.1 per cent of GDP in 2015, but falling global tea prices and a fall 
in tourism revenues as a result of terror threats have introduced new pressures. 
The government’s fiscal deficit is also relatively high.
Social and reputational risk
Several renewable energy generation projects have experienced distress as a 
consequence of disputes with local communities. These include the geothermal 
plant Olkaria IV and the wind power plants Kinangop and LTWP. 
The development of geothermal fields in the Naivasha area, where Olkaria IV is 
located, triggered a long-term land conflict, complaints to the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and World Bank, and a court dispute. A section of the Maasai tribe 
raised concerns in 2014 about increased impoverishment, intra-community 
disputes, health concerns and stress. Local dwellers had several complaints 
about the resettlement plan, including: increased transportation cost to their 
cultural centre; the construction of fewer houses than promised; compensations 
only given to some households; and impact on sacred and cultural sites in Hells 
Gate National Park.63 Kengen incurred resettlement costs of over KSh850 million 
(USD9.3 million) to satisfy local communities. 
The 60MW Kinangop Wind Farm, in Kajiado, which would have been Kenya’s first 
FiT project, was halted in 2015 after a series of protests and hostilities from the 
local community. Kinangop had already reached financial close and was ready to 
start construction, but increasing compensation requests from landowners ignited 
a conflict with developers which could not be resolved.64 
The 300MW LTWP has started construction but is facing a court case about illegal 
land acquisition brought forward by local communities. On the other hand, the 
LTWP consortium claims that local host communities are in full support of the 
project and do not feel the plaintiffs represent them.65 
Several interviewees raised social opposition as an important risk to their projects. 
They considered that while some local tribes have legitimate claims, many others 
63 https://communitylegalresources.wordpress.com/2015/05/22/maasai-issues-regarding-olkaria-iv-
geothermal-power-generation-project/.
64 Interview with QandE Director, EPC Contractor, 2015.
65 Interview with Project Manager, Aldwych International, 2015.
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seek illegitimate payouts and it is difficult to distinguish one from the other. There 
is a lot of uncertainty about the acceptable distance between wind generators and 
communities, as there is no specific legislation about it. There is also uncertainty 
about how to secure land and way leaves. The interviewed EPC contractor 
estimates that there is a much smaller risk of conflict with local land users when 
projects are developed by the government or local investors, which is why they 
prefer to work on local projects or those that are not 100 per cent private.
Community issues are a major problem in Kenya. They can kill a project. 
Protests scare investors and they are a massive reputational issue. This was 
particularly a problem for the transmission line of more than 400km. 
(Project Manager, Aldwych International, 2015)
Communities see it as the opportunity of a lifetime to get a payoff. 
Resettlements are a big issue and we have to budget for it… Negotiations 
have to be fast. Otherwise it becomes a snowball as the news spreads and 
more and more actors seek a payout. 
(Director of Quality and Environment, International EPC contractor, 2015)
The main barriers to investment are associated to the sociopolitical challenges 
linked to securing land and way leaves. 
(Chairman, KEREA, 2015)
Behind these conflicts there is the issue of unclear land property rights in 
Kenya and unclear social consultation guidelines that can provide certainty 
to both developers and affected communities. Besides, there are issues of 
unbalanced costs and benefits from large power generation infrastructure for rural 
communities, when these projects feed power directly to the transmission grid 
leaving local communities unconnected. 
Kenya has a poor record of human and labour rights, according to the 
empowerment rights index developed by CIRI, where it scores four out of a 
maximum value of 14. The index looks at the government performance for seven 
rights: foreign movement, domestic movement, freedom of speech, freedom 
of assembly and association, workers’ rights, electoral self-determination and 
freedom of religion (CIRI Human Rights Dataset 2016). Human Rights Watch 
denounces serious human rights violations by Kenyan security forces and 
widespread impunity at all levels of government. Security sector reforms, land 
reform and stronger accountability mechanisms have not been fully implemented.66 
Social and reputational risks therefore emerge as a significant constraint in Kenya, 
with the potential to block renewable energy investments. We finalise the analysis 
of risks by looking at governance in Kenya.
Governance risk
Kenya performs poorly in the Corruption Perception Index, where it ranks 139th 
among 167 countries. The percentage of firms that declare having to provide 
gifts to obtain construction permits or secure government contracts is higher 
66 www.hrw.org/africa/kenya.
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than in the SSA region as a whole. In contrast, Kenya’s record with regard to the 
transparency, accountability and corruption of the public sector is better than in LMI 
countries of the SSA region as a whole, according to the CPIA index. 
Corruption and political interference were mentioned as important constraints in 
our interviews. This is in spite of safeguards, such as the severe due diligences 
required by development banks as a requirement for financing, which require a 
paper trail for every expense. However, when projects are big enough, there is 
government support to avoid corruption.67 There is a view that ‘it is good to be on 
the side of the government for projects to be successful’.68
Security levels are better than elsewhere in the SSA region when looking at rates 
of homicides, but terrorist violence has been on the rise since 2011. 
To summarise, renewable energy projects in Kenya are attractive in terms of high 
potential returns and competitive costs. However, concerns arise from low levels 
of demand that are incompatible with the traditional approach to electrification 
through large-scale grid-connected generation projects; the risk of curtailment for 
intermittent generation; a deficit in transmission and distribution infrastructure; 
regulatory limitations with regard to planning and a large number of unsolicited 
proposals which may lead to a situation of overcapacity; low local skills and 
high social and reputational risks, and governance, linked to corruption and the 
government’s interference. 
5.2 Is appropriate finance available?
Even if returns of renewable energy projects in Kenya are potentially high, finance 
needs to be available for these projects to get built. The Kenyan financial sector 
is the third largest in SSA and has been resilient to domestic and foreign shocks 
in the last decade (World Bank 2015a). Access to finance is only considered as a 
major constraint to growth by 17 per cent of enterprises, as compared to 62 per 
cent of enterprises in Ghana, or 37 per cent in the SSA region (World Bank 2013c). 
In the analysis of financial constraints, we will first look at the supply of savings, 
and then at potential problems in the banking system. 
Access to external savings does not seem to be a problem. Kenya has long been a 
preferred country by donors, with higher levels of ODA per capita and per GDP than 
its regional and income level peers. This is also the case with the electricity sector, 
where – unlike Ghana – Kenya has attracted far more ODA as a proportion of GDP 
than the average LMI country. This is just short of 1 per cent of GDP in Kenya, 
compared to 0.24 per cent and 0.21 per cent in low-income and middle-income 
countries respectively, and less than this in Ghana. Consequently, Kenya has 
been able to attract low-cost finance from international donors for the development 
of electricity generation infrastructure, mainly geothermal. For example, public 
geothermal plants Olkaria I and IV pay average interest rates of 1.05 per cent and 
2.05 per cent for their debt, with average maturities of 23 years and 13.4 years and 
grace periods of between three and six years (Pueyo et al. 2016). 
67 Interview with Project Manager, Aldwych International, 2015.
68 Director of Quality and Environment, International EPC contractor, 2015.
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Kenya shows lower access to FDI inflows than its peers (see Table B14 in 
Appendix B). However, Kenya has been able to tap the global capital markets by 
issuing bonds to finance infrastructure projects and with a high participation of 
foreign investors in the Nairobi stock exchange. 
In spite of its ability to attract foreign finance, the Kenyan financial system faces 
new challenges to raise long-term funding as it consolidates its middle-income 
status and fills its vast infrastructure gap (World Bank 2015a). Funding is also 
required for small-scale off-grid infrastructure which will be part of the solution to 
low connectivity among the rural population, but traditional bank and donor funding 
for infrastructure may bypass these smaller projects due to their high transaction 
costs. Financiers complain of a lack of bankable projects in Kenya that are large 
enough for long-term financing.69 
The situation is different with domestic finance, where there is a lack of savings 
and very few domestic equity providers.70 Reliable local equity partners are 
important to attract foreign capital, as well as to ensure that there is a transfer of 
technology to the host country. Thus, Kenya’s weakness in this area could provide 
a major constraint for the future development of the sector. 
Despite these issues, Kenya has a relatively high level of stock market 
capitalisation compared to its peers, which may point to the importance of foreign 
capital and public investment for asset formation in the Kenyan market, and also 
suggests that even a relatively developed stock market is not generating the type 
of domestic equity investments needed to support renewable energy projects. 
Low levels of income per capita may be behind the low observed domestic 
savings. Access to banking services in Kenya is very high – reflecting the growth 
of the mobile sector – and tax revenue collection is in line with other SSA countries 
(see tables of indicators in Appendix B).
In line with these findings, there was agreement among our interviewees that 
access to international finance is not a major problem in Kenya.
There is no shortage of finance. Not generally. Generally there is enough 
finance, with more and more equity investors pursuing the high returns of the 
African continent. 
(Project Manager, Aldwych International)
The World Bank and the European Investment Bank are important sources of 
investment. International EPC contractors prefer to bid for projects financed by 
international banks, as they perceive a high risk of not being paid when projects 
are financed by local banks.71
Most respondents agreed that there is a positive bias towards renewables among 
international financial institutions, compared to fossil fuels. 
69 Interview with Senior Investment Officer, African Development Bank, 2015.
70 Interviews with Director of Research and Policy, KBA; and country economist, African Development 
Bank, 2015.
71 Interview with Director of QandE, International EPC contractor, 2015.
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It is much easier for renewable energy projects to raise finance than for fossil 
fuel projects… All the investors are interested in renewables and they can 
access different kinds of subsidies that the fossil fuel projects cannot get… 
The lending community is very biased towards renewables.  
(Project Manager, Aldwych International)
Funding options for fossil fuels are limited compared to renewable energy. 
(Director of Research and Policy, Kenya Bankers Association)
Interviewees also point at different financing models for fossil fuel-based or large 
hydro and renewable energy. 
Renewable energy projects change hands very frequently. They are sold 
and acquired frequently. Large fossil fuel-based plants usually stay with the 
same owner for their whole life. Fossil fuel plants are often financed with the 
balance sheet of utilities. They don’t need to look for investors. It could be the 
case that large utilities are not very competitive to finance and operate smaller 
renewables and this is better done by smaller investors.  
(Director of Quality and Environment, International EPC contractor)
Interviewees pointed in particular at the difficulties of getting finance for coal power 
plants ‘because they have very bad press’,72 highlighting that ‘only the Chinese are 
financing coal at the moment’.73 
However, there are advantages in financing fossil fuel-based generation.
There are a lot of diesel generators because they are very fast to install and 
individually have very low capital cost. 
(Project Manager, Aldwych International)
Because of experience and familiarity, it is easier to structure, price and 
finance fossil fuels. 
(Senior Investment Officer, African Development Bank)
We now look at the performance of the financial sector. Commercial bank lending rates 
were 16 per cent in December 2015 and treasury bill rates were 9 per cent. Interest 
rate spread in the banking sector is quite high, at 8.7 per cent but is comparable to the 
average spread for the SSA region. Bank concentration is significantly lower than in 
the SSA region and the LMI grouping. The Boone indicator also shows a higher level 
of competition between Kenyan banks than in other countries. 
Kenyan banks are less efficient than those in LMI countries as a whole, but more 
efficient than those in SSA, measured by their overhead costs to total assets. A low 
percentage of non-performing loans to gross loans in comparison to Kenya’s peers 
suggests the banking sector has been resilient to shocks and that risks are lower 
than in other countries. The system also shows the capacity to provide long-term 
funding, with high maturities of syndicated loans and external debt. 
In summary, access to external finance and intermediation do not pose significant 
constraints to investment. If anything, there has been an excessive flow of 
72 Interview with Director of QandE, International EPC contractor, 2015.
73 Interview with Project Manager, Aldwych International, 2015.
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concessional finance to Kenya, in particular to geothermal energy – a profitable 
and least cost generation technology. Concessional finance could have targeted 
other priorities, such as much needed transmission and distribution infrastructure, 
technologies to add flexibility to the Kenyan electricity system, off-grid systems of 
remote rural communities, or less mature technologies such as wind and solar PV. 
However, a lack of domestic savings could be an obstacle to investment. 
5.3 Narrowing down constraints and positing a syndrome
The decision tree analysis for Kenya has pointed at many positive developments in 
Kenya that facilitate investment in renewable energy. These were summarised by 
one of our interviewees:
Kenya is far ahead from the rest of Africa. They have a great track record. 
They have invested a lot in capacity building. They have got good advisors, 
strong political support and solid commercial relationships. I have a great 
opinion of Kenya Power. Their regulatory reform has worked. They are rapidly 
increasing electrification rates. The FiT are close to right. Solar could be 
higher. What reassures investors is to see that their competitors are being paid 
and are getting their investment back. That is why Kenya will go well. 
(Project Manager, Aldwych International)
However, some constraints remain. These come mainly from the ‘project 
attractiveness’ branch of the decision tree. Although we identified a shortage of 
domestic savings on the finance side of the decision tree, in this section we could 
not find enough evidence of its binding character. The final constraints refer to: 
high system costs coming from a large share of intermittent renewables and poor 
transmission infrastructure; low demand due to low ability to pay of population 
without access, economic growth below projections and low international trade 
of electricity; regulatory constraints at the planning and procurement stages, and 
uncertain land ownership; social opposition linked to land disputes; infrastructure 
deficits and poor governance. These are highlighted in bold in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2 Kenya’s constraints decision tree
Source: Authors’ own.
Problem: Suboptimal investment in renewable energy in Kenya
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As in the previous case study, the next step of the analysis looks for further 
evidence of the binding character of constraints through a number of tests adapted 
from the Growth Diagnostics framework. We look specifically at the behaviour 
of actors trying to bypass each constraint and at evidence that those actors less 
intense in a particular constraint are more likely to survive and thrive.
Firstly, evidence of binding constraints related to system costs comes from the 
behaviour of the off-taker and financiers. According to our interviewees, Kenya 
Power ‘is not in a hurry’ to agree more PPAs with wind power IPPs because they 
are unsure that the system will be able to cope with a larger share of wind power. 
Additionally, the World Bank withdrew support to the large LTWP on the basis of 
the high costs of a take-or-pay clause for Kenya Power given the high risks of 
curtailment, and the delays in completing the transmission line. The lack of system 
flexibility may therefore be an important constraint to further development of wind 
power plants. This could be addressed through interconnections with neighbouring 
countries that provide reserve power, management of hydropower resources, 
implementation of pumped storage in hydropower plants or diversification of 
renewable energy geographically and technologically. However, many of these 
solutions are expensive and the issue remains that the speed at which Kenya is 
trying to roll out wind is fundamentally difficult, and would be so in any country. 
Agents have tried to bypass this constraint through strong political support. For 
example, the LTWP is considered as a flagship project for the whole of Africa and 
became a priority for both the Kenyan government and the African Development 
Bank. To reach financial closure, the project required several risk mitigation 
instruments, including: a take-or-pay clause in the PPA; Euro-denominated PPA; 
and a partial risk guarantee to cover the risk of completion of the transmission line 
and commercial risks.
Second, the explosion of solar lighting and solar PV home systems and the large 
number of individual firms that own diesel generators in Kenya (57 per cent of 
firms according to the World Bank Enterprise Surveys) refute the hypothesis of 
low demand. Instead, the grid extension business model has not been appropriate 
for poor rural consumers. Poor rural consumers cannot pay for the large upfront 
costs required to connect to the national grid, and their daily consumption is too 
low for the national utility to get back their investment on grid extension. Off-grid 
solutions are providing poor rural consumers with a basic service and are able 
to bypass the constraint of upfront investments through pay-as-you-go schemes. 
These allow consumers to pay for the electricity they use and eventually own 
individual systems after a certain amount of payments. Ownership can also remain 
in the providers of the systems, who would also be in charge of maintenance 
and replacement. In this model, the energy supplier becomes the financier of the 
consumer. It thus requires access to corporate finance or working capital, which is 
expensive and hard to get for small companies operating in risky markets. The fact 
that many enterprises are purchasing generators, which are much more expensive 
than electricity from the grid, also shows that low demand is not the only problem. 
Constraints at the planning stage are evidenced by low electricity access rates in 
the country, in spite of sufficient capacity in the system. This shows that there has 
not been an effective rural electrification process in the past. Actors have bypassed 
this constraint by adopting off-grid systems beyond the national planning sphere. 
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However, new grid extension plans are constraining further investment in mini-grids, 
whose business model is jeopardised by the cheaper tariffs of the national grid. 
The coordination of off-grid and on-grid solutions in energy planning could further 
facilitate private investment in mini-grids. With regard to overrated expectations of 
economic growth, these may have led to overcapacity, which could become a future 
constraint to investment if it damages the financial sustainability of the off-taker. 
A high number of unsolicited proposals for renewable energy generation point to 
constraints at the procurement stage. The government is taking action to address 
this by limiting the FiT to small-scale projects and implementing a competitive 
bidding scheme for larger renewables, following Kenya’s previous successful 
experience with competitive bids for fossil fuels. 
Several signals point at the severity of social acceptance constraints. The shadow 
price of social acceptance is high, as shown by the high cost of resettlement plans, 
compensations, and court cases in several projects. The cost of abandoning a 
project after financial closure and once equipment has been shipped to the project 
is also very high. Actors more able to deal with social acceptance issues – such as 
the state – are more likely to survive and thrive. Large hydro dams or geothermal 
projects requiring sensitive negotiations for land acquisition from local communities 
have been undertaken by the state, or the sites have been previously de-risked 
for the private sector. For example Orpower, the only operational IPP in Kenya, 
became feasible when the Government of Kenya donated some wellheads to the 
private developer (it also removed exploration risks from the private investor). 
Fossil fuel-based thermal projects with a quicker turnaround and relatively more 
flexible in their location, have been typically developed by the private sector. This 
may also be related to lower vulnerability to financing costs. 
Expansion of transmission infrastructure is required so that the power 
generated in new plants can be transported to the load centres. The Treasury 
must give approval for new transmission lines and projects are mainly funded 
with development aid. Transmission infrastructure requires patient capital from 
investors but often this is allocated to other development priorities. A key hindrance 
to new transmission lines is the time-consuming process of acquiring way leaves 
and land for substations. The government is in charge of this process. We could 
not find evidence of shadow prices for transmission. However, we find evidence of 
actors trying to mitigate the risk of slow construction of transmission infrastructure. 
For example, the LTWP required a partial risk guarantee to cover the risk of 
completion of the transmission line in order to reach financial closure. 
We find several symptoms of a governance constraint. Renewable energy 
projects requiring heavy infrastructure investments in Kenya (mainly geothermal 
and hydro) are more likely to thrive if they are publicly owned and funded. Projects 
can bypass important constraints when they have strong political support. This is 
mainly granted to large-scale, flagship projects that are very visible to the public, 
or to short-term visible solutions to power crises like emergency diesel generation. 
For example, the LTWP became a political priority which facilitated the inclusion of 
several clauses in the PPA, which may prove risky for the off-taker: a take-or-pay 
clause; a payment security from Kenya Power through an escrow account raised 
via a tariff increase; a euro-denominated PPA; and a partial risk guarantee to cover 
the risk of completion of the transmission line.
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A lack of domestic savings could be an obstacle to investment, but we do not 
find strong signals about the severity of this constraint. The supply of private credit 
by deposit money banks is very high in comparison to other countries in SSA and 
close to that in LMI countries. Stock market capitalisation is also high. Interest 
rates offered by 90-day Treasury bills were 8.6 per cent as per December 2015, 
which is lower than the returns offered by renewable energy projects. Hence 
there is no clear evidence of the government crowding out the financial markets, 
as happened in Ghana. On the other hand, there is a heavy dependence on aid 
finance, which means donors have a strong influence on Kenya’s energy agenda. 
Also, there is a concern that lack of finance could become a severe constraint in 
the future because Kenya’s borrowing has escalated in recent times. 
We provide a theory to explain the prevalence of the constraints observed, which 
we call the syndrome of the rent-capturing elite. Kenya has had access to a 
large flow of foreign aid, but this has been mainly channelled towards the priorities 
of urban and political elites. Priorities have mainly consisted in highly visible, 
large-scale generation projects, such as government-sponsored geothermal plants 
or large wind power plants, feeding their energy directly to Nairobi and other large 
cities. It is questionable that financing geothermal power at nearly zero interest rates 
should be a priority for donors, as these plants are profitable and provide least cost 
electricity. Other investments, less visible and profitable, would have the potential to 
bring higher benefits for the poor. For example, improvements of the transmission 
and distribution network or the implementation of small-scale distributed generation 
for dispersed rural communities could improve the rates of access to electricity for 
the rural poor, but have been historically neglected by the elite.
There may be a rent-seeking dimension that explains the preference for 
large-scale projects, in terms of the ability of government officials to maintain 
control over access to sites, infrastructures and profits more easily (Newell et al. 
2014). Large-scale projects are also a source of pride for ruling politicians, and are 
aligned with the ambitions set up in Kenya’s national strategy Vision 2030.
Donor influence manifests not only in the flows of foreign aid but also in the 
choice of renewable energy support policies. For example, FiT were very much 
supported by donors, in spite of Kenya’s previous track record of competitive bids. 
FiT effectiveness to attract investment has been underwhelming and Kenya is now 
moving towards renewable energy auctions. 
The Government of Kenya has opened several fronts to address the constraints 
identified. These include a mini-grids regulatory framework, the geospatial 
mapping of the country for integrated grid and off-grid planning; and an auctioning 
scheme for renewables. If they are properly implemented, these could be game 
changers for the sector. 
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6 Discussion
The Green Investment Diagnostics framework has been effective to reduce a large 
number of potential constraints to investment in renewables to a manageable 
number in Kenya and Ghana. The decision tree tool has been particularly useful, 
but we have found some challenges to apply the original Growth Diagnostics tests. 
For example, we have not been able to look at the effect of movements in the 
constraint on the level of investment in the power sector. Investments in generation 
capacity in small national systems do not happen continuously, but are very large 
and infrequent. Also, data on shadow prices are unavailable for many constraints. 
Unlike the original Growth Diagnostics, we do not finish with the identification of a 
single most binding constraint, but propose instead a small group of interrelated 
constraints and a ‘syndrome’ to explain their root causes.
Before applying our diagnostics tool, we explained the context for investment in 
renewables in both countries. We found some similarities, such as the tension of 
preserving the financial sustainability of electric utilities while aiming for universal 
access. We also found a similar renewable energy policy portfolio, with renewable 
energy targets and FiT in both countries. 
In reality, Kenya and Ghana depart from very different circumstances. Ghana has 
been immersed in a power sector crisis for several years, with frequent blackouts 
and national power utilities on the brink of bankruptcy. Renewable energy does not 
feature as a key solution to energy security problems in the country. Ghana has 
instead emphasised the role of domestic gas resources to fuel its power plants. 
However, gas exploitation has been slow and local gas will not be adequate to 
meet the country’s gas requirements for the medium-to-long term. In the short 
term, to deal with a power supply crisis, Ghana has locked itself into expensive 
contracts with private thermal plants using imported fuel. 
Kenya instead has enough generation capacity to meet its current needs and 
may exceed capacity needs in the medium term. Its power utilities are financially 
sanitised, prices are set at cost-recovery level, there is a good track record of 
international competitive bids to procure generation capacity and a good history 
of honouring PPAs signed with IPPs. Kenya has decisively supported renewable 
energy, through a long-term geothermal plan and the approval of several wind 
power projects. The other side of the story is a large share of population without 
access to electricity and a level of social discontent that can halt infrastructure 
projects. Kenya’s electricity system also faces stability problems due to the fast 
penetration of intermittent renewables and the inflexibility of the current system.
Our analysis then questions if potential constraints to investment in Kenya and 
Ghana come from a lack of attractive projects or instead from a lack of appropriate 
finance. A decision tree, informed by indicators (included in Appendix B) and 
interviews with stakeholders (detailed in Appendix A) points at constraints in 
the project attractiveness side for Kenya, and in both project attractiveness and 
finance availability for Ghana. 
With regard to project attractiveness, the returns for renewable energy in Kenya 
appear higher than in Ghana, due to very good quality renewable energy 
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resources (mainly wind and geothermal) and access to lower cost finance. The 
LCOE for renewables is lower in Kenya than in Ghana but in both countries, 
electricity from renewables can offer lower costs than some of the procured fossil 
fuel-based plants. A potential weakness in Kenya is that intermittent renewables 
could impose considerable costs for the electricity system unless further flexibility 
is added through interconnections, storage or more flexible generation capacity. 
The risks of investing in renewable energy are higher in Ghana than in Kenya. At 
the core of Ghana’s risks there is an off-taker that cannot afford to pay the agreed 
FiT because its financial health has been damaged by prices below cost-recovery; 
system losses; poor metering and billing; unpaid bills; inflation and currency 
devaluation, in addition to poor management and political patronage. Kenya’s risks 
are mainly social, infrastructural and political. 
Both Kenya and Ghana present regulatory constraints to investment in 
renewables, but again these are more acute in Ghana. Both countries have 
experienced an explosion of unsolicited proposals following their approval of FiT. 
Ghana’s management of the issue has been contradictory: the regulator set caps 
to the total renewable energy capacity while at the same time provided provisional 
licences to projects exceeding those caps by far. Kenya’s FiT policy only applies 
to projects below a certain capacity and larger projects need to directly negotiate 
PPAs with Kenya Power. Both countries have recently manifested a preference for 
auctions instead of FiT, trying to emulate the success of South Africa’s Renewable 
Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement (REIPPP) auctioning scheme. 
Kenya’s position is clearer, as it will maintain FiT for small-scale projects, while 
pursuing auctions for large projects. Ghana announced a competitive bid for 20MW 
of solar PV at the end of 2015 but there has not yet been an awardee. 
Ghana’s financial constraints are also more acute than Kenya’s. There is a lack of 
domestic savings, and an excess of debt by the state, which has caused currency 
devaluation, fast inflation and fiscal imbalances. Government bonds offer higher 
returns than investment in renewable energy and there is overall a shortage of the 
long-term, low-cost finance needed for electricity generation projects. Even though 
Kenya has a shortage of domestic savings, it has benefited from substantial inflows 
of foreign aid. Foreign aid has, for example, provided debt at near-zero interest rates 
to geothermal plants, even though these are profitable and offer least cost electricity.
Ultimately, Kenya presents a more fertile ground for investment in renewable energy 
but must redistribute rents for the provision of electricity to the rural poor and to tackle 
its deficit on transmission and distribution infrastructure. Ghana is in dire need of 
long-term affordable finance to achieve a sustainable solution to its generation capacity 
deficit. The growth of renewables in Ghana will also need fully functioning utilities and 
a reliable policy framework. All in all, policy should target different priorities in Kenya 
and Ghana, and FiT or renewable energy targets are hardly the most appropriate 
instruments for both. Two subsequent studies on the political economy of investment 
in renewable energy in Kenya and Ghana propose a set of policies to address the 
specific constraints identified in each country, and analyse their political feasibility by 
looking at the political sources of support and opposition and their relative power.74
74 To be published in IDS Bulletin 48.5 (2017 forthcoming).
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7 Conclusions
The vast potential of renewable energy is failing to be realised in many African 
countries, in spite of the many pledges made by donors and international 
financiers. This is not due to a lack of policies supporting investment. Many 
African countries have renewable energy targets, FiT, or import duty exemptions 
for renewable energy technologies. In some cases these policies are not fully 
implemented. In others they are implemented but, put in the language of this 
report, they are not targeting the most binding constraints to investment. Whatever 
the reason for their lack of success, it is clear that simply introducing formal 
policies is not enough. 
In the research described in this report, we have developed and tested an 
approach to identify what these constraints might be. The Green Investment 
Diagnostics methodology is designed to help policymakers identify the most 
important obstacles to investment in the renewable energy technologies most 
suited to their countries, and deliver effective reforms to remove these obstacles. 
Constraints could arise from the lack of attractive projects, the lack of appropriate 
finance, or both. In many cases, there are a large number of issues that may be 
holding back investment. An important characteristic of our framework is that it 
helps to narrow down the hundreds of potential constraints to a handful of the most 
pressing. The method for achieving this relies on robust international comparisons 
of data drawn from a diverse set of credible sources. We triangulate the evidence 
with interviews with stakeholders and with diagnostic signals to assess the 
importance of each constraint. 
While constraints are likely to be country-specific, there are commonalities. As 
our analysis of Kenya and Ghana has shown, for example, FiT that provide a 
guaranteed income to generators for a period of time will only succeed when 
there is a reliable off-taker that can pay those fees, or a solvent state that can take 
responsibility through sovereign guarantees. Previous successful FiT also had 
a market large enough to make it worth the effort of calculating an appropriate 
tariff. Incentive mechanisms open to everyone, without total capacity caps or a 
procedure to prioritise proposals, are likely to clog small African power systems. 
When there is not a deficit in generation capacity, strategies to mobilise foreign aid 
would be best addressed to the electrification of the last mile or the improvement of 
transmission and distribution networks, instead of to already profitable renewable 
energy generation technologies. 
While there are commonalities, they will manifest themselves in very different 
ways in different contexts. An approach that targets support to the needs of each 
particular country is therefore likely to be more effective than simply importing 
policies that have enjoyed success elsewhere. Given this, we invite donors and 
national policymakers to replicate this exercise to better target their support to 
green growth in developing countries. 
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Appendix A Key informants
The names of informants are anonymised at their request and only their position 
in their organisation is disclosed. One particular company also requested that its 
name is not disclosed.
Appendix Table A1 Interviewees
Role of interviewee Organisation Country of operations
Type of 
stakeholder Date
Founder and Managing Director Upwind Ghana RE industry (wind) 21 October 2015
Chief Executive Officer Ghana Capital Partners Ghana RE industry 
(solar PV)
19 September 2015
Agency Director for RE and 
energy efficiency
Energy Commission 
Ghana (EC)
Ghana Regulator 19 September 2015
Deputy Executive Director Africa Center for Energy 
Policy (ACEP)
Ghana Thinktank 1 October 2015
Executive Director Kumasi Institute 
of Technology and 
Environment (KITE)
Ghana Academia 16 October 2015
Programme Assistant of 
Biomass, Renewable Energy 
Division
EC Ghana Regulator 1 October 2015
Head of Strategic Planning 
and Policy
EC Ghana Regulator 1 October 2015
Executive Director Solar Light Company 
Limited
Ghana RE industry 
(solar PV)
28 October 2015
Head of Research Division UT Bank Ghana Finance 2 October 2015
Director of Research Ghana Investment 
Promotion Centre (GIPC)
Ghana Government 2 October 2015
Project Director Aldwych International Kenya RE industry (wind) 11 September 2015
Quality and Environment 
Director
International EPC 
contractor*
Kenya RE industry (wind) 2 October 2015
Senior Investment Officer 
Infrastructure Finance and PPP
African Development Bank Kenya Finance 30 September 2015
Country economist African Development Bank Kenya Finance 30 September 2015
Director of Research and 
Policy
Kenya Bankers 
Association (KBA)
Kenya Finance 28 September 2015
Chairman Kenya Renewable Energy 
Association (KEREA)
Kenya RE industry 21 September 2015
Two staff members Kenya Investment 
Promotion Agency 
(KENINVEST)
Kenya Government 23 September 2015
Managing Director Integral Advisory Kenya RE industry 
(consultancy)
4 August 2016
Partner Garrigues Advisory Spain – 
International
RE industry 
(consultancy)
1 October 2015
* The name of the company is not disclosed at the request of the interviewee. 
Source: Authors’ own.
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Appendix B Comparison of  indicators 
from Ghana and Kenya
Appendix Table B1 Levelised cost of energy in Kenya and Ghana
LCOE (USD cents per kWh)
Technology Ghana Kenya
Wind 14.3 10.3
Solar 18.7 14.8
Hydro 7.9 10.7
Geothermal 7.3
Note: Using social discount rates. 
Source: Pueyo et al. (2016).  
Appendix Table B2 Returns on equity for investment in renewables in 
Kenya and Ghana
Returns (per cent)
Technology Ghana Kenya
Wind 6.9 14.3
Solar Close to 0 5.3
Hydro 33.5 5.3
Geothermal 16.8
Note: Using commercial cost of debt and prices at FiT. 
Source: Pueyo et al. (2016). 
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Appendix Table B3 Indicators of system costs in Kenya and Ghana
System costs
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya
Share of IRE % IRE capacity 6% (2020 target) 18% in 2019, from 1% in 2016
Diversification of IRE High or low with regard to technology and geography
High (geographically 
diversified solar PV below 
20MW and wind)
Low (only wind and more than 
50% in a single location)
Share of dispatchable 
generation
% generation from hydro 
(natural gas, hydropower, 
HFO and biomass plants 
as a share of the total)
100%
Around 44% in 2016, but with 
a small share of gas turbines 
and a large share of unreliable 
hydro and dirty diesel engines
Connectivity % of population connected to the grid 72% 47%
Transmission costs Responsibility for transmissison costs
Cost to metering point 
borne by generator
Project developer covers 
shallow costs, but delays in 
building new transmission 
lines can add to the cost of the 
project
Source: OECD/IEA (2015); Ghana: EC (2015b), GRIDCo (2014); Kenya: Lahmeyer International (2016), 
KPLC (2015).
Appendix Table B4 Indicators of demand in Kenya, Ghana, SSA and LMI countries
Demand
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya SSA LMI 
Growth GDP growth (%) 3.5% (2015)
4.5% (2016p)
7.7% (2017p)
5.6% (2015)
6% (2016p)
6.1% (2017p)
3.4% (2015)
3% (2016p)
4% (2017p)
2.6% (2015)
2.5% (2016p)
3.4% (2017p)
Growth volatility Standard 
deviation of GDP 
growth (2006–14)
3.15 2.22 1.24 1.22
Poverty Poverty 
headcount ratio 
at USD1.9 per 
day (2013)
24.2% (2012 
according to 
national poverty 
line)
50% (2012 
based on 
national poverty 
line)
42.7% (2012) n.a.
Poverty growth 
(2006–13)
-7.7% +4% n.a. n.a.
External sales 
of power
Interconnections 
exist
Yes Yes and more 
being built
Exports/total 
generation 
(2015)
4% 0.4%
Note: p = predicted. 
Source: ‘Growth’ and ‘Growth volatility’: World Bank (2016b).
‘Poverty’: Ghana: GSS (2014); Kenya: KIPPRA (2013); SSA: World Bank (2016b).
‘External sales of power’: Ghana: EC (2015b); Kenya: KPLC (2015).
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Appendix Figure B1 Average electricity end-user tariffs and FiT in Kenya and Ghana
Prices
Average electricity end-user tariffs in Kenya and Ghana
Kenya and Ghana’s FiT in USD per kWh
Note: Ghana’s tariff converted to USD at the exchange rate in June 2015.  
Source: Pueyo et al. (2016).
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Appendix Table B5 Average capacity factors of renewables in Kenya, Ghana, SSA and 
internationally
Average capacity factors
Technology Ghana Kenya Africa International
Wind onshore 25% 45% 32% 30%
Solar PV 17% 20% 22% 20%
Hydro 50% 55% 50%
Source:  Pueyo et al. (2016).
Appendix Table B6 Indicators of regulatory risk in Kenya and Ghana
Regulatory risks
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya
Planning Number of RE projects 
in the pipeline (with 
provisional licence)
82 50 projects for 1,139MW in the pipeline 
Projects that have been 
built 2 (22.5MW)
All planned except 360MW 
coal and 110MW wind
Procurement Number of projects and 
MW procured through 
competitive bids
1 solar PV project, 20MW 
(bid announced but not 
awarded)
7 fossil fuel projects for 
512MW
Number of steps and 
licences required to 
generate electricity
11 10–12, depending on the technology
Contracting and market 
access
Length of RE price 
guarantee 10 years 20 years
Exchange rate and 
inflation risk Not covered
Yes (tariff denominated in 
foreign currency)
Access to grid guaranteed 
by law Yes Yes
Connection cost covered 
by utility No No
% of generation capacity 
controlled by the state 73%
70% of capacity
80% of total electricity 
produced
CPIA property rights and 
rule-based governance 
index 2015
4 3
Source: World Bank (2016b); Energy Commission of Ghana (www.energycom.gov.gh); Energy Regulatory 
Commission of Kenya (http://erc.go.ke/). 
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Appendix Table B7 Indicators of off-taker risk in Kenya and Ghana
Off-taker risk
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya
Operational performance EBIT (if positive, EBIT margin) -123 million cedis 12%
Liquidity Current liabilities/current assets 154% 60%
Cash and cash equivalents/accounts 
payable and short-term borrowing 8% 91%
Financial structure Short-term debt/equity and long-term 
debt 45% 19%
System losses System losses (as % purchases) 23% 17.5%
Credit risk Revenue collection to sales 89.9%
Trade receivables past due by more 
than a year 13%
3% (over a year)
11% (plus impairment)
Receivables from public institutions 55%
Source: KPLC (2015); ECG (2013a).
Appendix Table B8 Indicators of resource and technology risks in Kenya, Ghana and 
LMI countries
Resource and technology risk
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya LMI 
Resource risk Resource assessments 
available
Yes Yes (except 
biomass)
Human resources Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary 
education
14.3% 4% 23%
Industrial 
development
Competitive Industrial 
Performance Index
0.074  
(119 out of 140)
0.01  
(108 of 140)
Grid capacity Enough transmission capacity to 
transmit projected generation
Yes Not at the moment, 
but planned
Source: World Bank (2016b); UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance Reports website  
(www.unido.org/data1/Statistics/Research/cip.html); UNIDO (2014); GRIDCo (2014); Lahmeyer International (2016).
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Appendix Table B9 Indicators of macroeconomic risks in Kenya and Ghana
Macroeconomic risk
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya
Currency risk Change in exchange rate (USD per local 
currency) 
-65% (2011–15) 
-18% (2015)
-13% (2011–15)
-10% (2015)
Inflation Consumer Price Index year-on-year 
December 2015
17.7% (2015) 6.6%
Fiscal stability Current account deficit -9.2% (2014) -7.1%
Fiscal deficit -10.4% (2014) -7.3% (2015)
Source: Bank of Ghana website (www.bog.gov.gh/); Central Bank of Kenya website (www.centralbank.go.ke/).
Appendix Table B10 Indicators of social and reputational risks in Kenya and Ghana
Social and reputational risk
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya
Social discontent Precedents of social discontent in 
renewable energy projects
Land grabs for 
growing biofuels
Yes 
Clear social consultation guidelines No No
Human and workers 
rights 
CIRI empowerment rights index (2011 
is latest value)
11 (out of 14) 4
Source: ActionAid (2012); Danwatch (2016); McGovern (2016); CIRI Human Rights Dataset (2016).
Appendix Table B11 Indicators of governance risks in Kenya, Ghana, SSA and LMI countries
Governance risk
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya SSA LMI 
Corruption CPIA transparency, accountability 
and corruption in the public sector 
index (1 low – 6 high)
3.5 3 2.74 2.97
Transparency International 
Corruption Perception Index (rank)
56 out of 167 
global
7 out of 47 SSA
139
Percentage of firms expected to 
give gifts to secure a government 
contract
35.2% 33.4% 31.7%
Percentage of firms expected to give 
gifts to obtain a construction permit
35.1% 34.6% 29.5%
Security Intentional homicides per 100,000 1.7 7 14.4 5.9
Threat of terrorism Low High
Source: World Bank (2016b, 2013b, 2013c).
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Appendix Table B12 Indicators of supply of domestic finance in Kenya, Ghana, SSA and 
LMI countries
Domestic savings
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya SSA LMI 
Access to domestic 
savings
Gross domestic savings 
(% GDP) 2014 17.73 5.2 17.84 23.23
Gross capital formation 
(% GDP) 2014 26.24 22 21.31 25.11
Private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP 
(%) 2013
14.2 29.1 16.7 32.2
Stock market 
capitalisation to GDP 
(%) 2013
7.5 25.4 22.2 16.6
Low disposable 
income
GDP per capita 
(constant 2010 USD) 1,670.7 1,101.2 1,162.1 1,969.5
Access to banking 
services
Commercial bank 
branches per 100,000 
people 2013
6.0 5.6 3.9 8.2
Bank accounts per 
1,000 adults 470 652 166 396
Tax collection Tax revenue (% GDP)
average last 5 years 13.723 15.81 15.25 10.98
Source: World Bank (2016b, 2015c).
Appendix Table B13 Indicators of supply of international finance in Kenya, Ghana, SSA and 
LMI countries
Foreign savings
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya SSA LMI
Foreign 
investment
FDI, net inflows (% of 
GDP) 2014 8.7% 1.5% 2.5% 2.1%
Ease of Doing Business 
(2016 rank)
114  
(11th SSA)
108  
(9th in SSA)
Portfolio equity, net 
inflows (% GDP) 2009 2.1% 1.1% 0.8%
Aid Aid inflows, net ODA 
(% GNI) annual 
average 2010–14
4.1% 5.14% 3.1% 0.9%
Net ODA received per 
capita (current USD) 
average 2010–14
61 59.5 50.2 16.4
Source: World Bank (2016b).
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Appendix Table B14 Indicators of financial intermediation in Kenya, Ghana, SSA and 
LMI countries
Intermediation
Topic Indicator Ghana Kenya SSA LMI 
Poor 
intermediation
Bank lending–deposit spread 
2015 16 8.7 8.8 6.8
Competition Bank concentration (%) 2013 70.1 51.6 75.4 70.1
Boone indicator (2013) -0.13 -0.09 -0.05 -0.05
Cost Bank overhead costs to total 
assets (%) 5.7 4.7 5.2 3.4
Performance Bank return on equity (% after 
tax) 2013 31.8 15.5 15.5 11.2
Bank non-performing loans to 
gross loans (%) 12 5 5.6 5.6
Stock market returns  
(% year-on-year) 74.4 50
Short-termism Syndicated loan average 
maturity (years) 2013 1.1 9.5 4.5 5
Average maturity on new 
external debt commitments 
(2014)
12.1 (2014) 
18 (2010–14)
16.7 (2014)  
28 (2010–14)
Source: World Bank (2016b, 2015c).
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